Chapter Two: Theoretical Background

 

This study deals with the phenomena of in- and exclusion and thus, theoreti­cally, it belongs to the field of the study of ethnicity. Before turning to the empiri­cal part, I will give a brief overview of current theories of ethnicity and critically examine how they contribute to an understanding of processes leading to the construction of in- and outsiders from an anthropological perspective.

 

 

I The development of the study of ethnicity

II Influential approaches : a selection

III  Scientific focuses

IV A questionable terminology

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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I  The development of the study of ethnicity

 

The study of ethnicity is still in its infancy. The term 'ethnicity' emerged in the 1960s in the Anglo-American area (Orywal & Hackstein 1993: 593) in connection with the post-colonial era and the lack of successful integration in and identifica­tion with the nation-state of large numbers of people in many different parts of the world^[21].

There are innumerable definitions of ethnicity (see, for example, Cohen 1974: ix-xi, Cashmore 1984: 85-90, Chapman, McDonald & Tonkin 1989: 11-17, Elwert 1989: 32-38, Linnekin & Poyer 1990: 2, Orywal & Hackstein 1993: 597-604). Their core seems to be the consciousness of belonging to an ethnic group. But what is an ethnic group? Basically, two kinds of answers have been suggested to this question. The first is called essentialism (or primordialism), the second situatio­nalism (or formalism, instrumentalism, circumstantialism).

Up to the 1960s, social scientists held an essentialist view on ethnic groups defi­ning these according to so-called objective criteria, i.e. a group's common origin, history and culture (language, religion, customs), in short its common essence. Hence the term essentialism. These criteria had been singled out in order to classify the colonized world by ethnic groups. Thus, which people constituted a particular ethnic group was decided by outsiders of that group, but thought of as the natural result of an evolutionary process. It was believed that in the course of its history, human kind had split up into objectively defined ethnic groups.

In 1969, Frederik Barth edited a collection of articles about 'Ethnic Groups and Boundaries' which induced a revolution in the study of ethnicity suggesting an alternative answer to the question raised above. Ethnic groups were no longer thought of as being defined by objective criteria applicable to the whole world, but as defined by the concerned people themselves, i.e. by subjective criteria^[22]. According to this new, dynamic definition,  it is the features "which actors them­selves regard as significant" (Barth 1969: 14) which are crucial, i.e. an ethnic group is acknowledged as such as long as its members think of themselves as a community with a collective identity, regardless of whether the criteria put for­ward by them are obvious to outsiders or not, or historically true or not. In short: an ethnic group is a group which defines itself as such^[23]. With Barth's pioneering publication, belonging to an ethnic group became a matter of self-identification and self-ascription (Barth 1969: 10) and thus lost its supposed stability and natu­ralness. Ethnicity became a matter of choice rather than a matter of facts. Barth's main contribution was to shift the focus from descriptions of ethnic groups within presumably given, natural boundaries to the analysis of the processes lea­ding to the construction and maintainance of ethnic groups and boundaries.

 

"The critical focus of investigation from this point of view becomes the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses." (Barth 1969: 15)

 

In the 1970s, it became clear, that the boundaries separating ethnic groups from each other are culturally constructed rather than pre-determined as the essentia­lists had assumed. It was recognized that these boundaries are the momentary re­sult of social processes based on subjectively selected criteria and that they are constantly being negotiated. Because the representatives of this position intro­duced by Barth believe that ethnic groups and boundaries are subject to changes, depending on particular situations at certain times, they are called situationalists^[24] as opposed to essentialists^[25] stressing the quasi-eternal character of ethnic groups. For situationalists, it is crucial that a group of people perceive themselves as an ethnic group, not why  they do so.

 

"The whole point about ethnicity is that it is as real as people want it to be. The group may have no significance at all outside the percep­tions of the group members themselves; yet it is real to them and their subjective apprehension of the group motivates them to orga­nize their lives around it." (Cashmore 1984: 88)

 

It was also understood that one and the same person can identify with more than one group of people at the same time, depending on the situation. For example, as will be explained in the next chapter, Greek-Cypriots perceive themselves as Greek and Cypriot at the same time, stressing one or the other aspect of their identity depending on the situation. Moreover, one and the same person can change her or his ethnic belonging (ethnic conversion). For example, born Turkish-Cypriots married to Greek-Cypriots consider themselves Greek. The fle­xibility of ethnic boundaries is not taken into account by essentialism.

Barth's second major contribution was his insight that ethnicity is always a matter of thinking about contrasts, about 'us' and 'them', about in- and outsiders at the same time. He showed that thinking about one ethnic group is like trying to clap one hand^[26], that a group's sense of identity always develops in an effort to differentiate itself from others.

Barth's dynamic concept of ethnicity largely displaced the essentialist position and became generally accepted and established. It is the basis of most contem­porary theories of ethnicity.

 

Weber  - whom Barth (1969) does not explicitly refer to - recognized as early as in 1922 (cf. 1976) that ethnic belonging is based on subjective  choices and interpreta­tions on the part of the members of an ethnic group^[27]. Weber understood that ethnic groups are the result of social processes rather than naturally given catego­ries. For him, people's shared Habitus - by this he means their outward appea­rance - and way of life [Lebensgewohnheiten] are the crucial criteria by which they identify as an ethnic group. Even though ethnic communities are in fact social, particularly political or linguistic communities, perceived sameness in Habitus and way of life leads to the subjective belief in a community based on common origin and descent which is exactly what defines an ethnic group for Weber (1976: 237).  Perceived differences in Habitus and way of life leads to the opposite, to the construction of outsiders. Weber understood that ethnicity has little to do with objective, but a lot with subjective criteria on the basis of which people are categorized as in- or oursiders. Weber also recognized the fuzziness of the boun­daries between ethnic groups, because customs [Sitten], i.e. Habitus and way of life, do not change abruptly, but gradually in regard to space and time. Weber also recognized that ethnicity is based on a concept of 'us and them', of sameness [Gleichartigkeit] and difference [Gegensätzlichkeit] mutually dependent on each other. He understood that group identity develops in contrast to other groups. These are precisely the two major points Barth discovered again some forty years later. Both Weber and Barth recognized that ethnic groups and boun­daries are subjectively defined, and both recognized that ethnicity depends on a concept of contrasts.

 

To summarize, the currently widely accepted, situationalist concept of ethnicity ultimately goes back to Weber (1922) and more obviously to Barth (1969). Let me quote Smith's definition of an ethnic group as representative of the situationalist position:

 

"... we may define the ... ethnic community as a social group whose members share a sense of common origins, claim a common and distinctive history and destiny, possess one or more distinctive charac­teristics, and feel a sense of collective uniqueness and solidarity."                                                      (Smith 1981: 66)

 

In order to give an impression of what theorists of ethnicity have been focussing on, I now turn to summarize the ideas of some prominent and influential wri­ters who follow the situationalist tradition. Although some authors claim that there has recently been a revival of essentialism (cf. Elwert 1995: 109-10), there is quite enough evidence showing that essentialism is completely untenable. Therefore, I will not refer to essentialist theorists. The Cypriot example shows particularly clearly that essentialist theories have worn out. To jump ahead of my argument, Turkish-Cypriots and Turks from mainland Turkey are considered by both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots themselves^[28] as two distinctively different groups of people although they share all objective criteria put forward by essentialists, i.e. language, religion, origin. On the other hand, Turkish- and Greek-Cypriots are perceived as one group despite their apparent differences in essentia­list features.

 

Although I only present a small number of authors, I believe they represent the most influential theoretical approaches to the study of ethnicity.

 

 

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II  Influential approaches: a selection

 

Abner Cohen (1974) is considered the founder of the political approach to ethni­city, and more specifically of the interest group approach. Criticizing , I believe wrongly^[29], Barth's concept of ethnic groups and boundaries, Cohen argues that ethnicity has to be understood as a political phenomenon, rather than a cultural one. According to Cohen, ethnicity has to be analyzed "in terms of interconnec­tions with economic and political relationships" (xv). The politicization of "non-political formations" (xvi) and the instrumentalization of ethnicity stand at the centre of attention in his approach. Formally organized interest groups are consi­dered "the most efficient and effective type of human organization" (xvii). Ethnic groups are interests groups struggling for scarce resources who are unable to or­ganize formally, therefore they organize informally using cultural symbolism to make up, so to speak, for the lack of formal organization. In short, ethnicity is a political phenomenon supported by economically motivated, informally orga­nized interest groups, i.e. ethnic groups. Furthermore, ethnicity is to be analyzed by means of studying its objectively observable symbols. Cohen's approach was sen­sational because he included groups such as the London city men in his definition of an ethnic group (cf. 1974: xviii-xxiii) thus taking a radically situa­tionalist view on the phenomenon of ethnicity. In contrast to most other situa­tionalists, the members of an ethnic group are not necessarily linked by pre­sumed common origin according to Cohen.

 

Anthony D. Smith (1981, 1991, 1992a,b) takes up a more restrained position than Cohen. Although he is clearly on the situationalist side, neither extremely essen­tialist nor extremely situationalist theories do justice to the phenomenon of eth­nicity in his view. He is wary of situationalists overstating "the mutability of ethnic boundaries or the fluidity of their cultural contents" (1991: 24). To him, "ethnicity exhibits both constancy and flux side by side" (1991:25), indeed, "the central paradox of ethnicity [is] the coexistence of flux and durability" (1991: 38).

Although Smith focuses on the phenomenon of nationalism and the precondi­tions and emergence of nation-states, the analysis of ethnicity is central to his ar­gument, because he understands nationalism to be intimately linked to ethnicity: "...nations always require ethnic 'elements'" (1991: 40), but not the other way round, because ethnicity has existed long before nationalism, though the two are very similar in structure and quality. Therefore, nationalism is not a new phe­nomenon altogether as supporters of the modernist theory (Gellner 1983, Ander­son 1993, Hobsbawm 1983) assert (Smith 1992b). Rather, it is a transformed ver­sion, a continuation of ethnicity dressed up as new. Another central point in Smith's argument is the crucial role he attributes to the intelligentsia in the pro­cess of transforming ethnic into national ties over the last two centuries. In con­trast to Cohen, Smith stresses political and cultural factors and criticizes approa­ches focusing too much on economic aspects which to him can never satis­factorily explain ethnicity (Smith 1981: 4).

 

Michael Banton (1983) takes up an individualistic approach adapting the theory of games developed in economics to the study of ethnicity. The rational-choice theory he advocates is based on the assumption that "individuals act so as to ob­tain maximum net advantage" (p. 104). The attempt to maximize profit is thus the driving force behind people's rational choices and behaviour. The members of an ethnic as of any other group "exchange goods and services, seeking their own advantage" (p. 136). They comply with each other only because at the end of the day it is profitable to do so in the competitive race for scarce resources. Cooperation only works as long as people maximize their individual profit by cooperating with others. It is compulsion and calculation rather than particular ties people perceive to have to one another which explains why there are social groups. Accor­ding to the rational-choice theory, society is not "based upon the sharing of ultimate goals and values" (p. 109), but on individuals trying to maximize their own profit. There are no primordial bases of solidarity ties in human society" (Hechter 1983: 54). The conception of man in this theory is utterly pragmatic.

 

Similar to Smith, Donald Horowitz takes up a moderate situationalist position understanding ethnic boundaries to be "malleable within limits" (p. 66).

The starting point of his analysis of "Ethnic Groups in Conflict" (1985) is the ob­servation that ethnic conflicts have gathered worldwide momentum. His main concern is to develop a comprehensive theory of ethnic conflict based on cross-cultural and cross-national comparison^[30] and to describe "measures to abate it" (xii). He takes a critical view of both the modernity theory of ethnicity claiming that the worldwide ethnic revival is caused by modernization and the materialist theory interpreting ethnicity as the struggle for scarce resources (p. 99-135). To him, both concentrate too much on economic factors and on the role of the elites manipulating and instrumentalizing the masses and are therefore at a loss to ex­plain the contributions of non-elites.  The crucial question of "why the followers follow" (p. 140) remains unanswered in contemporary theories. Instead, Horo­witz proposes an approach that takes symbolic as well as psychological issues such as emotion, passion and anxiety into account. "A bloody phenomenon cannot be explained by a bloodless theory" (p. 140). Central to his argument is the structural equation of kinship and ethnicity which he interpretes "as a form of greatly extended kinship" (p. 57). Both kinship and ethnicity involve duty, emotion and reliability expressed in familistic language. The impact of artificial ethnic boundaries drawn by European colonial powers is , according to Horowitz, greatly exaggerated. It was not the new boundaries cutting across indigenous ones which led to new forms of ethnicity and ethnic conflict. It was the sheer size of the colonial territories which forced people to look for new loyalties as a substitute for kinship ties which were no longer sufficient to provide for the well-being of the individual in these greatly enlarged territories. Whereas in precolonial, little centralized times kinship provided for identity, ethnicity took its place in colonial and post-colonial settings offering  orientation and security. Hence it is "functionally continuous with kinship" (p. 78). Ethnicity became a new source of identity in a greatly enlarged society full of strangers. It is, Horowitz argues, at root a response to "the need for family and family-like ties" (p. 88). If kinship cannot provide for this need, something else must.

Another central argument in Horowitz' theory is a psychological one (cf. p. 141-184). He argues that ethnic conflict is primarily caused by "the struggle for relative group worth" (p. 141), for "the need to feel worthy is a fundamental human re­quirement" (p.185) and "the fears of domination" are strong. The "backward-ad­vanced dichotomy" (p. 182) makes some groups feel unworthy and hence rebel against this condition. Since ethnic belonging is basically determined at birth, it is for life and therefore, interethnic group comparison is a particularly important source of self-esteem (p. 147)^[31]. So, individual self-esteem is intimately linked to group worth, and group worth and legitimacy are achieved through politics and power, through "collective social recognition" (p. 185), through the mechanism of in- and exclusion. Having all of this in mind, it becomes clear why Horowitz begins (xiii) and ends (681-684) his comprehensive analysis with a plea for de­mocracy which goes hand in hand with conflict reduction - and he goes to quite some length to show this in great detail -, because by definition democracy is "biased against birth" (p. 87) and hence the most promising solution to ethnic conflict.

 

Strictly speaking, Carter Bentley (1987) does not fit into the group of the situatio­nalists for he explicitly distances himself from both essentialism and situationa­lism critisizing them for neglecting the microprocesses at the individual level (p. 26). Drawing on Bourdieu's Theory of Practice (1977), Bentley formulates a "practice theory of ethnicity" (p. 24) within which the habitus plays the vital role. The habitus is an internalized pattern "beyond the grasp of consciousness" (p. 28) resulting from practical experience. Within the limits of structural possibilities, people make practical experiences from an early age on which in turn determine their habitus as "the perception of the possible, the reasonable, and the desirable" (p. 44). Ethnic identity is, Bentley argues, an expression of people sharing a habi­tus, because "affective affinities [are] based on shared habitus" (p. 36) while gaps in habitus lead to ethnic differences. In short, it is their shared habitus which explains how "people come to recognize their commonalities in the first place" (p. 27). Practice is the foundation of the habitus and hence also of ethnicity. There is thus an "objective grounding for perceptions and feelings of ethnic affinity and difference" (p. 40), namely practice. Because the habitus is by definition uncon­scious^[32], both to elites and to followers, its "enchantment" (p. 43) helps to main­tain and sanction domination and thus also explains the relationship between leaders and followers within an ethnic group. Similar to Horowitz, Bentley de­scribes ethnicity as fictive kinship (p. 33, 42) both of which rely on shared habitus.

 

Georg Elwert (1989, 1995) is primarily concerned with showing that ethnicity, na­tionalism, nativism and fundamentalism (and possibly other -isms) are structu­rally the same phenomena, namely we-group processes. Hence they need to be analyzed jointly. He focuses on the motives and the dynamics underlying and the conditions favouring we-group processes and on the main actors operating within them. Furthermore, he critisizes the naturalization of the concept of the ethnic group (see below) and finally, he discusses the "polytaxis" of human beings (1995: 110-115), i.e. our multiple identities.

 

 

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III  Scientific focuses

 

As already outlined, the concept of ethnicity introduced by Barth stresses the sub­jective character of the criteria leading to the construction of an ethnic group. As a consequence, situationalists started to occupy themselves with the question of what, if not the supposed objectively defined tribes, ethnic groups are. If they were socially constructed, what motivated people to organize in ethnic groups? The concept of the ethnic group is understood as a misleading, but highly effec­tive cover term for a joining together of people motivated by 'something else' than ethnic ties. But what is this 'something else' masquerading as ethnic iden­tity? Many studies dealing with this question come to the conclusion that ethnic groups are in fact politicized socio-economic interest groups. Solidarity amongst the members of an ethnic group is, according to this approach, based on their shared socio-economic situation - due to class related or regional differences for example - , i.e. on common interests, rather than ethnic ties, but this sort of eco­nomically motivated solidarity is skilfully transformed into presumably ethnic ties by actors profitting by ethnic movements. Most studies of the 1970s support this interest group approach introduced by Abner Cohen (Williams 1989: 404) stressing the competition and struggle for scarce material as well as symbolic  resources as the driving force behind ethnicity and the often addressed revival of ethnic sentiments and movements in the post-colonial era. In the 1980s, the study of ethnicity got increasingly linked to the study of nationalism (Williams 1989: 403).

 

To summarize, social scientists studying ethnicity and ethnic groups have focused on questions such as: To what extent are ethnic groups economically mo­tivated, to what extent politically or regionally? To what extent do ethnic groups overlap with socio-economic classes? Under what circumstances and how can people be mobilized to form and to act as an ethnic group^[33]? How is ethnicity in­strumentalized and politicized in the interest of the powerful? Which groups of actors are the driving force behind social movements supported by ethnic groups? What is the relationship between leaders and their followers? Do there need to be any leaders at all? What role do local elites and the middle classes play, what role the intellectuals and the intelligentsia? What is the relationship bet­ween ethnicity and nationalism and between ethnic groups and nation-states? Is there an intrinsic connection between the development of modern, post-colonial nation-states and the formation of ethnic and nationalist movements and the frequency of ethnic conflicts?

In short, social scientists have focused on economic and political factors, on the mobilization of ethnic groups, on the instrumentalization and politization of ethnicity and on the pre-conditions of ethnic and nationalist movements and conflicts. Social scientists have occupied themselves with the influence of the macro- and the micro-level respectively, of the international, the national and the regional level, of endogenous and exogenous factors leading to ethnic mobi­lization, with the influence of the world-system economy on the formation of ethnic groups and movements. Few researchers have addressed the relationship between gender, ethnicity and nationalism (but see Yuwal-Davis & Anthias 1989). The analysis of conflicts  (e.g. Horowitz 1985, Smooha & Hanf 1992) has been the main topic of the scientific discussion of ethnicity. The so-called Cyprus problem  - which is, I believe, wrongly depicted as an ethnic conflict - is an illustrative example of this.

 

All of these approaches are certainly valuable and offer a lot of interesting in­sights and information, but, as far as I am aware, they all explain ethnicity from the perspective of the outsider, or else the grassroots perceptions they are based on are not made transparent.

 

" ... what matters sociologically is what people actually do, not what they subjectively think or what they think they think."

                                        (Cohen 1974: x)

 

I am in no position to criticize the answers given to the questions raised mainly by sociologists (e.g. Smith, Banton) and political scientists (e.g. Horowitz), but I think there is a shortage of questions asked from a social anthropological point of view^[34]. It is not a matter of what sort of answers are being given, but of what sort of questions are being asked. Differentiating myself from the above statement, I have tried to understand the processes leading to group-consciousness (ethnicity) from a grassroots perspective with this study. I have tried to look at the house from inside.

 

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IV A questionable terminology

 

Not only was it recognized by situationalists, following Barth, that ethnic groups are subjectively defined groups of people whereby the features or criteria leading to their collective ethnic identity, to their "sense of peoplehood" (Horowitz 1985: 51) and to the exclusion of others vary. Recent studies by social anthropologists (cf. Elwert 1989, Linnekin & Poyer 1990, Astuti 1995) also showed that group iden­tity does not necessarily need to be based on the notion of ethnicity as most situa­tionalists maintain.

 

"Although writers since Barth have acknowledged that ethnic boun­daries do not necessarily rely on any measurable cultural content, most continue to hold that ethnic identity is a fundamental and uni­versal reality of social life." (Linnekin & Poyer 1990: 3)

 

The criterion of common descent as defining group membership and identity is by no means universal. Rather, it is the result of Western colonization and of the preoccupation of social scientists with groups of people claiming to be an ethnic group that one gains the impression of the whole world being organized along ethnic lines (Elwert 1989: 26, Linnekin & Poyer 1990: 2). Compare, for example, the following quotes:

 

"Ethnic bonds and ethnic consciousness have always constituted im­portant elements in human existence since the dawn of recorded history" (Smith 1981: 87)

 

"Virtually every human being belongs to an ethnic group." (Eriksen 1993: 10)^[35]

 

Many authors have concerned themselves with the question of where to draw the boundary between ethnic and non-ethnic groups leading to a great number of definitions, but only few have asked why there should be such a boundary.

This naturalization of ethnicity is helped by the fact that a lot of studies deal with situations of ethnic conflict when the leaders of the different groups involved re­fer to common descent in order to legitimize their claims. Though it is true that many groups of people do in fact (or have learnt to) refer to ethnic ties in their self-definition, this is not true for all so-called ethnic groups. To some people, ethnic origin is simply irrelevant or at least not primary. It is not the criterion by which they categorize the world around them. Let me give an example of a culture very different to that of Cyprus.

The Vezo, a so-called ethnic group living in Madagascar, do not think of them­selves as being Vezo because of their ethnic belonging, but because they fish, as convincingly presented by Astuti (1995). It is their activity of fishing which makes them to Vezo. Therefore, people who stop fishing, shop being Vezo. Dead 'Vezo', too, stop being Vezo^[36]. Therefore, the Vezo are not an ethnic group, neither is a Vezo born as such nor by definition a Vezo for all of her or his life. Because Vezoness is tied to the activity of fishing, one can gain and lose it^[37].

In other words: not all groups of people referred to as ethnic groups base their identity on ethnicity. Thinking in ethnic categories is by no means universal. Like every other category, the one of the ethnic group is socially constructed. There are no objective, let alone natural categories. Ethnicity is "the Western ... theory of group identity", it is "a biological model of identity" (Linnekin & Poyer 1990: 2, 12, emphases added). Alternatively, group identity may  for example be based on village membership or other kinds of locality, on social institutions such as generation, age or marriage classes, on material culture, a particular way of subsistence economy or particular activities^[38]. Not all groups of people with a collective identity feel as an ethnic group. Moreover, not all people believe that one is born as a member of a particular group. While some so-called ethnic groups may indeed refer to their common origin and blood - visible in their shared (sometimes invented^[39]) traditions -, others may refer to being fishermen in their self-definition as one group of people for example. The list of possible criteria is open-ended. It seems to be universal that human beings organize in groups, that they differentiate between in- and outsiders. But on what grounds varies considerably.

Nevertheless, and quite surprisingly, the terminology referring to the notion of the ethnos has survived, sometimes in inverted commas. The term ethnos is of Greek origin, meaning a people or a nation (but not a nation state, cf. Just 1989), and is based on the notion of shared blood and descent (Just 1989: 77)^[40]. Because reference to blood ties does not necessarily stand at the center of the self-percep­tion and self-definition of so-called ethnic groups, the terminology based on the notion of the ethnos is misleading. While it is appropriate to refer to an 'ethnic group' if  its members base their collective identity on presumed common de­scent, it does not seem to me to be meaningful to analytically distinguish between such ethnic groups and other groups with a collective identity, just because they base their respective identity on different criteria. Why should the notion of the ethnos be given priority over other notions of identity? Such an analytical di­stinction only underpins the putative universality of ethnicity. There is no reason to make two categories of groups: ethnic groups and others. Neither is there any reason to analytically differentiate between groups with a collective identity one is born into and groups a member of which one can become . All the more so, because the differentiation between group membership by birth as opposed to choice is far from clear cut (cf. Horowitz 1985: 55-56). If one distingui­shes between ethnic and other groups, one would logically also have to differen­tiate between endogamous and exogamous groups, because through marriage people change their ethnic belonging all the time, a fact which runs contrary to the concept of the ethnic group defined by birth. As Horowitz rightly points out: "We are dealing with a continuum and not a dichotomy" (1985: 56). After all, ethnic as well as non-ethnic groups are groups with a collective identity, and it is only our emphasis which picks out and isolates the ethnic group. Therefore, I be­lieve that the terms 'ethnicity' and 'ethnic group' are misnomers of the overall phenomena they describe. They are remnants of the essentialist era assuming ethnic ties to be the universal criterion of group membership and identity. Collective identity is not the same as ethnicity. Unless one strips the ethnos of its connotations of blood and descent, it seems to me to be an inappropriate term for modern social anthropology (which interestingly is called 'Ethnologie' in German). Not that ethnicity is not one important and widely spread concept, but there seems to be given far too much weight to this particular concept of group identity to the extent that other concepts are not taken account of. Perhaps the study of ethnicity should give way to the study of group identity understood in a wider sense.

For the purpose of this study therefore, rather than defining the more limited concept of ethnicity, I define group-consciousness as the consciousness of there being in- and outsiders and of belonging to the group of insiders. Similarly, rather than defining 'ethnic group', I refer to a group of people who perceive themselves as having a collective identity,  in short a group of people with group-consciousness (or we-consciousness) as an in-group, (we-group [Elwert 1989, 1995], identity-group).

 

And that brings me back to Cyprus and the Greek-Cypriots' construction of group-consciousness.

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