This work examines the psychological, historical and political barriers between Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the context of the psycho-historical point of view. Although the creation and maintenance of the borders between the ethnic groups have been explained by the realist theories, peace research introduces a new perspective how the border were created and maintained. It examines the issue of barriers between the ethnic groups through "psychological lens."

In this paper, I will mainly analyze the sources of the borders by applying the psychoanalytical theories into the historical and political events. The basic concepts, narcissism of minor differences, suitable target of externalization, projection, chosen traumas and glories, dehumanization, the egoism of victimization, the need for the enemies and allies, and the ethnic identity formation, are the product of the Vamik Volkan's psychodynamic approach.

Brief information:

Cyprus is strategically located in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea and the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea, after Sicily and Sardia. These three geographic characteristics -location, size, and the fact that it is an island- have been an important factor in the ethnic conflict in Cyprus. The island is about 42 miles (65 kilometers) south of Turkey, 64 miles (103 km) of Syria, 240 miles (386 km) of the north of Egypt and the Suez Canal, and 500 miles (…km) of south-east of the Greek mainland. (Joseph, 1997, p.58, Sonyel, 1997, p.1). It has an area of 3,572 square miles (9, 851 square kilometers) and the island is divided between the Greek Cypriot South and the Turkish Cypriot North . According to the census of 1960, the population of the island was about 77 percent Greeks, 18.3 percent Turks and 4.7 percent other ethnic groups, such as Maronites, Armenians, and Latins (Necatigil, 1993, p.2). Today, the population of the South is estimated to be 629,500 (1998). According to the 1996 census in the North, the population there is 200,587, constituting just over 24 percent of the total population of the island (Dodd, 1998, p.1). The Greek Cypriots are Orthodox Christians and speak Greek. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots are in Muslim faith and speak Turkish.

II- History of the Cyprus Conflict:

Because of its strategic position on the main routes between Europe and Asia, Cyprus has been the focus of the political conflict and the cultural interaction. Cyprus was colonized in about the thirteenth century BC by settlers from the Aegean and Greek colonists. Despite many invasions and periods of foreign rule, Greek language and culture became dominant. During the Medieval period, Cyprus has been held by the Western powers. In 1571, the island was conquered by the Ottoman Turks. Under the Ottoman rule, the Greek and Turkish populations have lived relatively peacefully in which they have collaborated to protest against the Ottoman rule when it was accused of excessive taxation (Bahceli, 1990, p.23, Dodd, 1993, p.2).

In 1878, Britain leased Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire to be used as a base from which to protect the Ottoman Empire against the ambitions of Russia. In 1914, the island was annexed by Britain on the outbreak of war with the Ottoman Empire. After Cyprus became a "Crown Colony" of Britain in 1925, the Greek Cypriots began their long and intense struggle against British rule to achieve the part of the Megali Idea (Great Idea): Enosis (unification with Greece). (Dodd, 1998, p.8). During the early period of British administration (1878-1925), the two ethnic communities lived in relative functional harmony with physical intermixing and social tolerance but without cultural integration (Fisher, 1992, p.2). Between 1925 and 1960 Cyprus conflict can be defined like this: the Greek Cypriots agitating for Enosis, the Turkish Cypriots opposing the movement, and the British Government replying in the negative to the Enosis demands (Sonyel, 1997, p.4).

In 1950, Makarios, who would later become the first president of the Republic of Cyprus, was elected Archbishop. Under the auspice of the Greek Orthodox Church, an island-wide plebiscite called for an overwhelming support for Enosis (% 96) (Bahceli, 1990, p.33, Dodd, 1998, p.11). With the establishment of the EOKA (Ethnici Organosis Kyprion Agoniston-National Organization of Cypriot Combatants), an underground guerrilla organization, the Greek self-determination campaign began in 1955 (Dodd, 1999, p.5). Because of their strategic interests in Middle East, the British resisted self-determination and Enosis. The British eventually concluded that their interests could best be served by retaining the sovereignty of their military bases on the island and by achieving a political settlement that would satisfy the interests of the majority Greek community on the island while protecting the interests of the minority Turkish community (Hampson, 1996, p.40). Prior to 1955, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots never actively involved in the politics of Cyprus. However, the immediate danger of Enosis forced them to reexamine their interests in Cyprus. In particular, Turkey expressed its concern about the future of a Turkish minority under the majority of the Greek Cypriot rule. Moreover, Turkey had strategic concern about the extension of Greek territory under "its nose". As a result, the Turkish Cypriots aligned themselves with the British, adopted taksim (partition) as a counter to Enosis and formed a paramilitary organization (TMT-Turkish Resistance Organization) to defend their interests (Fisher 1992, p.3).

After the intense and violent intercommunal fighting and the anti-British struggle by the Greek Cypriots, a solution was negotiated by Britain, Turkey and Greece and resulted in the London and Zurich Accords in 1959 and 1960. The accords prohibited Enosis and taksim and introduced bi-communal/federal solution for the island. Britain, Greece and Turkey had a right to intervene, unilaterally or together, in order to restore the state of affairs in the island. The constitution of Cyprus was designed by three powers. The president would be a Greek Cypriot and the vice-president a Turkish Cypriot. There would be a Council of Ministers (7 Greeks, 3 Turks) and a House of Representatives (70 percent Greek, 30 percent Turkish) elected by a universal suffrage for a term of five years. The Republic of Cyprus was eventually came into existence on 16 August 1960, with Makarios its first president.

During the end of the 1963, the intercommunal violence caused an imminent threat for the stability of the island. Nicosia, the capital of the Republic, became a battleground and physical segregation of the two communities intensified. Between 1963 and 1974, the Turkish Cypriots were forced to live in enclaves on their own in overcrowded slum conditions. They have lived in 5 percent of the island's territory and 25,000 Turkish Cypriots have become refugees. Meanwhile, the UN Security Council decided to send a peacekeeping force. A buffer zone marked by the "Green Line" was drawn between the conflicting groups. Since March 1964, the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has deployed to prevent a recurrence of fighting and to contribute the maintenance of law and order and the restoration of normalcy to the island.

The history of the island took a dramatic turn when the Greek-sponsored coup engineered against the President of Cyprus, Makarios in July 1974. Because of the fear of Enosis, Turkey decided to intervene unilaterally and seized 37 percent of the island. Cyprus was divided into northern (Turkish) and southern (Greek) section by the "Attila Line", running from through Nicosia to Famagusta. The Turkish intervention caused huge personal and social tragedies. Approximately, 180,000 Cypriot Greeks became refugees, fleeing to the south and abandoning their possessions behind. There was also 6,000 dead and 1615 missing person on the Greek side (Yilmaz, 1998, p.66).

After the coup and war of 1974, the efforts of peaceful resolution of the Cyprus conflict have been increased at the intercommunal level as talks and negotiations between the leaders of the two communities. Between 1974-1990, the major third-party has been the UN Secretaries-General. They have attempted to mediate the intercommunal talks: Denktash-Makarios (1975-1977), Denktash-Kyprianu (1977-1988), Denktash-Vasiliu (1988-1993), and now Denktash-Klerides. With the end of the Cold War, the United States and the European Union began to play more important role in the negotiation process.

Both sides see the political reconciliation and the solution of the conflict differently. The Turkish Cypriot community demands the recognition of its separate political status, which culminated in the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983. On the other side, the Greek Cypriot community sees the solution of the Cyprus problem only in the context of a bi-communal solution that allowed for the "three freedoms": freedom of settlement, freedom of property ownership, and freedom of movement. The removal of Turkish forces from island was another Greek Cypriot precondition for settlement. Furthermore, other issues had to be dealt with such as the question of Turkish settlers on the island, international guarantees to replace the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, economic reconstruction, exploitation of resources, and development of infrastructure on a joint rather than unitary basis (Hampson, 1996, p.40).

In 1993, the United Nations initiated a new attempt to obtain agreement that produced the confidence-building measures (CBMs). CBMs essentially involved the opening of Nicosia International Airport (closed since 1974) and the permission of the Greek Cypriots to reoccupy Varosha/Maras lost in 1974. They failed miserably.

In 1997, the UN tried to bring the two sides together in two meetings, one in New York, the other in Switzerland. The question of the sovereignty of the North became a crucial issue. Recent developments have made the dispute more difficult to solve. First, the decision by the European Union to open the membership negotiations with the South stopped the UN sponsored negotiations that just began after the quake in Turkey. Second, the establishment of a Joint Defense Doctrine between Greece and the South has alerted Turkey about the strategic importance of the island.

Cyprus conflict can be analyzed three different levels. At one level, Cyprus conflict is an inter-communal conflict that began as a colonial struggle against British rule. At another level, it is a regional conflict because of the relationship between Greece and Turkey over territory and resources in the eastern Mediterranean as well as their relationships with the two communities in the island. For Turkey, Cyprus is mainly as strategic matter. Because of its great proximity to Turkey, Cyprus could be dangerous for Turkey if in enemy hands. Cyprus seems as a huge aircraft carrier that threatens the most of the Turkish main cities and industrial areas. Moreover, the historical animosity between Greece and Turkey was another important factor. For Greeks, Cyprus was historically Greek and the part of the Hellenic world. The Turks represent the chosen traumas such as the lost of Constantinople, the destruction of the Byzantine Empire and the eviction of the Greeks from Anatolia after the First World War. Furthermore, it is an international conflict that involves superpower politics, the international and regional organizations (the United Nations and the European Union). At systemic level, the conflict in Cyprus became entangled in the politics of the Cold War. The conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and other areas were a potential source of weakness on NATO's southern flank.

III- The Historical and Political Barriers:

The Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots have been divided along linguistic, ethnic, cultural, and religious lines. The Greek Cypriots speak Greek and identify with the Greek nation, Greek culture and the heritage of classical Greece and the Byzantine Empire. They put more emphasis on "the chosen traumas and glories" of the Greek nation. Almost all of them are members of the Orthodox Church, which is has had a great place on politics, education, and cultural arena of the Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots speak Turkish and identify with the Turkish nation, Turkish culture, and the heritage of the Ottoman Empire. Virtually all of them are Muslims of the Sunni sect.

One of the historical-structural barriers between two communities is the Ottoman millet administrative system on the basis of religion and ethnicity. According to this system, each religious ethnic group was treated as a distinct entity. They had a right on their administrative issues and they were carried out with the help of the various religious institutions. After the conquest of Cyprus by the Ottoman Empire in 1571, the autonomy of the Orthodox Church was confirmed and the archbishop was recognized as the religious and political leader of the Greek Cypriot community. As a result, the church became a symbol of political and ethnic unity for the Greek Cypriots and it helped them preserve their religious, ethnic, cultural and political identity. On the other hand, the millet system contributed to the polarization of ethnicity. When the British took control over Cyprus, the millet system was not completely abolished. Although a modern bureaucratic administration was established and two communities have introduced some modern concepts and processes to create a common identity-Cypriot identity, they still retained control over matters of religion, education, cultural, personal status, and communal institutions.

Another historical/structural factor is the two ethnic group's conflicting views about the political past and future of the island. The Greek side perceived the past history of island embedded in its chosen trauma and glories. Throughout the British period, Enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece) as the most persistent and rigid goal of the Greek Cypriots. It can be interpreted as part of a wider Panhellenic movement of Megali Idea (Great Idea) which aimed at reconstruction of the Byzantine Empire. The Greeks' inability mourn over the lost of Byzantine Empire and the transfer of this past trauma from one generation to next, combined with the irredentist nationalism of the nineteenth century, found its expression in the term of Enosis on Cyprus. The Megali Idea was result in one major war between Greece and Turkey between 1920-23 and the defeat of the Greece in Asia Minor. Also, it created the exchange of the population which include 1 million Greeks and 650,000 Turks. This mass migration also reinforced the perception of enemy image and the egoism of victimization. On the Turkish side, the idea of taksim (partition of Cyprus into Greek and Turkish sections) was introduced by Britain and Turkey as a counter force to Enosis. Both movements were supported by Greece and Turkey respectively. The conflicting goals of Enosis and taksim led to a political polarization between the two ethnic groups.

The British colonial policy that was based on "divide and rule" maintained and reinforced the ethnic, administrative, and political separation inherited from the Ottoman period. Unfortunately, the British administration made no effort to create a unifying Cypriot identity and political culture. The two communities were treated as separate groups for administrative purposes and antagonism between them was stirred. The maintenance of a psychological and administrative gap between the two ethnic groups was instrumental in securing British control over Cyprus.

The political barrier of the Cyprus conflict was based on in fact the London and Zurich accords and the constitution. The agreements were signed on the behalf of the Cypriot people by Turkey, Greece and Great Britain. Also, the constitution that was the part of the accords was never submitted to a referendum and it was imposed by foreign powers. From the beginning, the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the island were limited by the station of military forces and the right to interfere its domestic affairs.

The ethnic dualism was institutionalized in all sectors of public life. A political framework conducive to ethnic separation was established. Although the Enosis and partition of the island was prohibited by the constitution, the alternative system did not promote integrative politics that cut across the political boundaries. This "paralysis state" reinforced and preserved the past practice of the ethnic and political cleavages through institutionalization. Public institutions that may help to build a common identity and bureaucratic class promoted the ethnic interests. As a result, the system paralyzed most vital organs and functions essential for a state and a society. For example, the disproportional partition of the public service, the police, and the army, veto right in the government matters, and separate majority vote in the parliament intensified the ethnic controversies.

Physically, they lived in separate villages and in separate quarters of towns. In his study on the political geography of Cyprus, Richard Patrick has provided statistical evidence that indicates a substantial decline in the number of mixed villages containing both the Greek and Turks from 1881 to 1931. (Patrick, 1976, p.8&12). After 1931, the decrease of mixed settlement became even more eminent, reflecting at the very least the preference of people of both communities to live in areas where there was ethnic kinship. According to the 1960 census, there were 114 mixed villages out of a total of 634 (395 were entirely Greek and 121 entirely Turkish.) (Yilmaz, 1998, p.52) . During the intercommunal conflicts in 1963, both communities accepted a truce that arranged a cease-fire line, now known as the "green line", patrolled by British forces. With the deployment of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), this line became permanent borders between two communities. After 1974 intervention, a new border was formed in which both sides were physically separated from each other up until now. Interestingly, this line is called as the "Attila Line" that reminds both sides different chosen traumas and glories. For Greeks, Attila was a barbarian who invaded Rome and destroyed the Roman civilization that was the continuation of the Hellenistic culture. On the other hand, Attila is represented glory times for Turkic-Mongol period for Turks. From outside, they seem similar to in some extent, but still they still have "minor differences."

The segregation of education that inherited from the Ottoman millet system and the British colonial era has reinforced and sustained the ethnic cleavage. During the British rule, the two communities had separate schools which were controlled by their respective religious institutions. In this period, Orthodox priests and Muslim clergies were also schoolteachers. Moreover, they virtually established dependent relations in educational area to their motherlands. The curricula and textbooks used in Cypriot elementary and high schools were mostly imported from the two mainlands. As a result, they have focused on their religious, national, ethnic heritage and values and imported the long history of Greek-Turkish rivalry into the island. Because of the lack of the college and universities, both communities' youths have gone other institutions in Turkey, Greece, Great Britain and other countries. This situation has created a lack communal interaction in educational and intellectual fields and reinforced one-sided "ethnic way" of thinking among the two communities. For example, the first university in both sides of the island established in 1992. The University of Cyprus has educated the Greek Cypriots since its establishment. The result was a growing gap in perceptions, attitudes, and conflict behaviors held by the two communities about each other.

The two communities also had their own newspapers and other publications which have mostly produced a media war between two sides. The local press in the island together with imported items from Greece and Turkey emphasizes Greek-Turkish antagonism and enhances mutual fears and stereotypical perceptions.

The above factors- church dominance, millet system, fragmented ethnic education, antagonistic national loyalties, political polarization and the British policy of 'divide and rule'- contributed to the preservation of the ethnic identity of the two Cypriot communities and the generation of a political schism between them. Four centuries of geographic proximity and physical intermixing did not produce inter-communal co-existence and common Cypriot identity as a counter force the dividing effects of religious, administrative, educational, social, psychological, and cultural differences.

IV- Psychological barriers:

Psychologically and socially, the two ethnic groups remained largely divided. The first psychological barrier is the issue of the lack of the common Cypriot identity and the emphasis of Turkish and Greek identity. Although both communities have lived on the same island for over 400 years, they have maintained their Turkishness and Greekness. When the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960, there was no Cypriot nation other than two different communities or nations. After the independence, the two communities continued celebrating the national holidays of Greece and Turkey which were mostly directed against each other. Moreover, the official flag of Cyprus appeared only at certain places, such as Makarios' presidential palace. On other places and occasions, the Greek and Turkish national anthems and flags were used during these celebrations. Up until now, Cyprus has on national anthem of its own. When the Cypriot Turks raised the red-and-white flag of Turkey and the Cypriot Greeks displayed the blue-and-white one of Greece, both communities reinforced their sense of separateness and their loyalties to Greece and Turkey. As a result, there has been no sign of common political culture and mass legitimacy for the new state-Cyprus.

Describing the attitudes of the Cypriot toward the official Cypriot flag, Vamik Volkan, a professor of psychiatry with Turkish Cypriot, also wrote:

When my artist brother-in-law was asked to design a flag for the newly-constituted Republic of Cyprus, he was told that he could use white, which appears both the Greek and Turkish flags, but that he had to avoid using red, which appears on the Turkish flag, and blue, which is used on the Greek flag.Accordingly, he used yellow with some green, these relating to no country in question. This yellow-green-and-white banner is still the official flag of Cyprus. When the Republic was established, however, Cypriot Turks raised the red-and-white flag of Turkey, and the Greeks flaunted the blue-and-white one of Greece. The official yellow-green-white one appeared only at certain locations, such as Makarios' presidential palace-as an ornament. The story of a Cypriot flag, designed for an imaginary Cypriot nation, and the population’s response to it, indicates that Realpolitik found no echo in the psyche of either Cypriot Turk or Cypriot Greek. (Volkan, 1989, p.308).

The second dimension of psychological barrier can be explained by psychoanalytical approach. This approach focuses on the issue of chosen traumas and glories, the egoism of victimization, narcissism of minor differences, the suitable target of externalization, enemy images, and the ethnic group formation.

Psychodynamic approach rests on in part on the application of psychoanalytic defense mechanisms, including externalization, projection, and identification, that individuals are used them to protect themselves from perceived psychological danger (Volkan, 1988, 1990). Externalization and projection are ways of getting rid of unpleasant self-images, feeling states, thoughts, and impulses which cannot integrated with the image of the self by attributing them to the external world. In other words, they involve transferring and projecting unconscious and unacceptable impulses, thoughts, and characteristics into an outgroup so that the individual can maintain an acceptable and cohesive sense of self (Volkan, 1985, 1988; Ross, 1995, Fisher, 1997). Identification is an unconscious process by which one assimilates the images of another with oneself. In conflict situation, the ethnic group to which one belongs is differentiated itself from other groups.

According to Volkan, the border between two ethnic groups reveals rituals that occur between their members. Erecting a psychological border between the two ethnic groups that prevents each group's externalizations and projections from back to in-group is one ritual. Without a psychological border, each ethnic group would become a replica of the other. In that situation, the externalization and projections needed to provide cohesion for group identity would be unstable. Sometimes these invisible borders are made manifest in attention to physical borders. When neighbor groups are not in conflict, physical borders are flexible and large groups reduce their investment in them. For example, crossing border between Canada and the United States is little more than a formality since no threat is involved in moving from one large group's territory to the other's. Under conflict situations, however, physical borders serve a double duty: they provide practical physical protection, and they are "psychologized" to represent a symbolic thick skin that protects large groups from being contaminated (1997, p.105).

Therefore, it is critical to have an effective psychological border than simply a physical one. Physical borders are successful when they represent a sufficient psychological one. When clear physical demarcations do not contribute to an effective psychological border, an anxiety and regression within large groups in conflict and any possibility of interpenetration has to be defended against it. This principle can be closely observed when someone visits exaggerated physical borders, such as the Green Line in Cyprus, or demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. Along such borders, elaborate rituals are common, including ceremonious changing of guards, constant monitoring and maintenance, and complex protocols and practices (Volkan, 1999,p.232). When members of large groups feels that their psychological borders are threatened, they may consider killing out-group members rather than continue to live under the anxiety. In such a climate, chosen traumas and glories, mourning difficulties, and feelings of entitlement to revenge are reactivated.

Some mental borders take the form of a shared mythical belief in a fantasized physical structure that protects the group, like an invisible wall that keeps dangerous elements out. For example, Cypriot Turks living in the Nicosia enclave surrounded by Cypriot Greeks between 1963 and 1968 also believed in a great weapon that was located in the only mountain in the enclave (Volkan, 1979, p.98).

Volkan (1985,1988) maintains that there are human needs determine the group's friends (allies) and enemies between in-group/out-group. Thus, human being posses an inherent need to have both enemies and allies. Similarly, there is a need to maintain a border and to preserve identity from contamination with enemy images. This psychological mechanism helps us to maintain our separate group identities. We can see this in any problem-solving workshops. Volkan calls this "accordion phenomenon" At first, the group experienced a period of closeness and aligned themselves physically and emotionally with the other group (out-group). This illusionary sense of brotherhood because of the mechanism called reaction formation (unconsciously doing something contrary to one's true but hidden wish) produce a defensive move in which the distance is reestablished. The togetherness becomes too much to tolerate. The extension and contradiction of the accordion gradually became less pronounced and the accordion keeps playing in lesser degree. The accordion ritual also reflected a need to have and maintain a border between the antagonists. (Volkan, 1997,p.102, Fisher, 1997,p.111)

Another psychoanalytic concept that helps us to explain ethnic conflict is the narcissism of minor differences (a term introduced by Freud). During pre-Oedipal period, there are two major principles that govern enemy-ally relations between one large group and another. The first principle deals with a sameness between ourselves and our enemies, between their ethnic group and ours. Although the opposing ethnic group is a reservoir of our psychic material, there is an unconscious perception of a certain likeness. Such likeness must be denied and never permitted to enter our consciousness in order to keep our projections, externalization, and displacement stable and the identity of our group and ourselves cohesive. The second principle concerns the need for a psychological gap between rival groups. When two ethnic groups live side by side, they do not want to acknowledge a total likeness, so they focus on -or create- minor differences. In time of peace, these differences are exhibited by dress, dances, speech patterns, and the like. In time of hostility, however, these minor differences assume a major emotional importance; some people have even given up their lives rather than abandon them (Volkan, 1990).

Volkan gives two examples of the importance of minor differences in Cyprus. Until 1974, Cypriot Greeks and Turks could differ themselves from each other at a glance by insignificant details for the visitor from other countries. For example, Greeks usually preferred the brand of cigarettes that were in blue and white, the Greek national colors-a suitable target of externalization. Turks, on the other hand, smoked the red and white package of cigarettes, the Turkish colors. In the villages, the Greeks wore black trousers and shirts, the Turks red (1990, p.108, 1997, p.111).

Although the psychological barriers between Cypriot Turks and Cypriot Greeks were formed during the Greek and Turkish war of independence, it hardly came to an end with the physical and more psychological division of Cyprus. The Greek-Turkish conflict is more psychologized-contaminated with shared perceptions, thoughts, fantasies, and emotions (both conscious and unconscious) are related to past historical traumas and glories. Modern Greece came into existence after the Greek war of independence (1821-1829) when the new Greek State separated from the Ottoman Empire. Modern Turkey was born in the early 1920s after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the defeat of Greeks in Anatolia (Asia Minor). The process of the formation of the Greek and Turkish identity still influence the present-day nationalism and psychological factors of the conflict.

Another psychodynamic process that affects the formation of psychological borders between two groups is the concept of the chosen traumas and glories. It refers an event that invokes in the members of one group intense feelings of having been humiliated and victimized by members of another group (Volkan and Itzkowitz, 1994, p.7). The Greeks, as a group, psychologically reached back to the fall of Constantinople as their prime chosen trauma. Every suffering since then condensed with the event of 1453 and its mental representation. It affects the Greeks' international relationships, especially their relationship with Turkey. (Ibid, p. 181). Because both nations historically have forged its national identity by defining itself against other groups, major events have contributed the in-group/out-group differentiation. Apart from the wars of independence, the "exchange of population" in 1930s, the 1955 incidents against Greek minority in Istanbul, and the situation of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace have created enemy images in both sides of the Aegean Sea.

Vamik Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz have studied this phenomenon and underlined these interesting findings. The most frequently featured foreign news items in the Greek media concern Turkey, yet Greece is only the sixteenth most featured news item in Turkey. (p. 167). In fact, Greeks are three times more pre-occupied with Turkey than vice-versa and, on average, devote six times more newspaper space on "Turkish" feature stories than their Turkish counterparts (Ibid). They point to certain key historical occurrence in Greek and Turkish relations, which had an impact on both the Greek and Turkish psyche:

V- Conclusion:

Because of the need to preserve differences and describe one group's members from another, it is more effective to make borders flexible, accessible and negotiable than to remove them. The late president Anwar Sadat saw the psychological barrier between Egyptians and Israelis a problem that needed to be removed. Although the barrier certainly was an obstacle on the path to peace, removing it entirely would have caused further complications because a sense of shared identity without a border induces aggression, as each group tries to recover its individual identity.

There are contemporary concerns, but it is clear that the past chosen traumas lives on powerfully in the Cyprus conflict. The Greek Cypriots are outraged by the "invasion" of 1974 and the losses it caused them. Many of them regard the island as historically theirs. The Turks believe, on the other hand, that they have as much right to be there as the Greek Cypriots. For them, Cyprus never becomes part of the Hellenic world. The Greeks traditionally dislike and fear the Turks. They have also believed that being in a large majority in the island gives them to right to rule. The Turkish Cypriots also re-live history to some extent. They were not long ago the rulers in Cyprus and are outraged at attempts to treat them as a mere minority. History has left them with a deep distrust of mediators, like the UN. Although the political, strategic, and military issues play an important role in the conflict psychological and historical barriers are real issues to need to address by the conflict resolution practitioners.

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Konuk Yazar|Ana Sayfa