Reporting from a paranoid [hopefully transitory] moment in history

If things continue as they seem to be going and the T/C community votes yes, then it lays legitimate claim to its representation in the European Union [EU] since the application was done in the name of the republic of Cyprus which is bicommunal. The fact that the EU was present in the last phase of the talks, and the European commission approved/accepted the Annan plan, implies that in this shift of geopolitical status of our island [the integration in the EU] both communities have a legitimate claim. I guess what upsets so much the nationalists and some of the rejectionists [because not all rejectionists are essentially Greek nationalists] on this [G/C] side is that the possible yes of the T/C community will be undoing part of their monopoly of the state within the EU which was secured with the refusal’s of Denktash in 2002, 2003.

But let’s come to this, the G/C community. The hysteria against the Annan plan is a typical case of media and elite manipulation of public opinion which at times comes close to totalitarian mind control. Somebody told me for example that last night when they went to the church for Easter the priest started to preach against the Annan plan – horror memories of the 50’s. It may not be universal but moments like this appear here and there – there were teachers for example who went on to terrorize the kids about the disaster of the Annan plan if their parents say yes. This is closer to the time of the military dictatorship in Greece. These may appear as remnants of the past but in effect they are part of a postmodern media campaign. Much like the campaigns in the US which preceded the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. When Bush went to war in Iraq actually more than 50% of the Americans believed that Saddam was responsible for 11/9. Constructed realities are part of the politics of this age of spectacular politics. Let me try to retrace what I have observed – meaning I have no way of knowing what the elite is saying amongst itself but I will try to judge from what they allow to slip in public discourse. There is for example a possibility that everything we are watching is a theatre and the G/C elite decided to allow a no to get hold in order to see what will happen afterwards – if it will get “something more” or whether the EU entry will give it any extra leverage. So far this scenario hasn’t been suggested so I leave it as a possibility. The story we have watched for the past one and a half year goes like this: Papadopoulos was reluctantly accepted by the leftist voters in 2002. One of the key issues of contention was his well known [but “of the past”, argued AKEL’s leadership] rejectionism. So he toned it down to the point that going into the final stage of last year’s February elections, Mr. Tassos seemed like a moderate and demanding lawyer for the G/C community. And all seemed to be going well as long as there were no discussions or when Denktash kept refusing everything so Papadopoulos could appear as well meaning but…After the New York deal this year Papadopoulos’ imposed [and it passed through most of the media] a sense of censorship on the positive [for the G/C] aspects of the Annan plan. The argument [recently articulated even by a member of the UN team - it was thus presented in the talks] was that if G/C public opinion was negative then the bargaining team [Papadopoulos et.al] would have a point to argue – give us something to help change the public’s views. AKEL’s leadership which was assumed to be the solid base for the support of any solution went with this self censorship. The leader of the right DISI [Anastasiades] was more reluctant but he toed the line [the position of the DISI for the plan could be attributed in part to the fact that it was the historic founder of the party, Clerides, who helped shape it – but also to a more fundamental shift in the ideology of the right as it Europeanizes – but this is beyond the present comment].

Now the fact that the G/C elite feels so comfortable in manipulating public opinion and even using this manipulation as a bargaining chip can be traced to the peculiar form of “national unity” which followed the events of 1974 in the G/C community. This unity is based on a structure of manipulation – the double speak of its political elite. The G/C political elite has been talking in two voices since 74. Its internal discourse has proclaimed the return to the pre-74 situation as a paradise to be recovered. In this narrative the T/C are not seen as enemies but as well meaning figures “victims somehow” of 74. Their travails in the period 64 – 74 were never discussed and in this internal discourse all would be happy if just Turkey left. Externally [i.e. to international organizations and in its national council discussions] the G/C elite has been talking of a bizonal federation. Since the early 90’s the reality of the external discussions started slipping into the internal political discourse but still at key moments when the media unleash an emotional fervour [against the Ghali plan for example, or during the missile crisis] the internal propaganda of the elite becomes the self evident truth which holds together a heterogeneous mixture of conflicting views – as is the situation now. The totalitarian climate created is similar to the structures N. Chomsky describes for the US system of control. The enemy is demonized and the internal voices of dissent are marginalised. Keep in mind that the T/C are not the target of the hatred – the enemy is Turkey, the settlers, Annan, Ghali etc..Demons that for some reason conspire against the G/C. Paranoia and hysteria mix at the collective level.

The subculture of the Left around AKEL, despite all its compromises was a stable “wall of resistance” to this climate. In this period however this “wall of resistance” has been dormant. AKEL’ leadership has followed Papadopoulos policy and some factions of it moved even enthusiastically to his support. To explain this one has take into account that this is the first time the G/C Left participates actively in the government with party members and that the prominence of Christofias as parliamentary chairman adds to this climate “of being in power”. It’s what we call “chairs” of power in everyday life, the perks of administering the state. This week though things suddenly had a weird twist bringing back painful memories for the Left of AKEL. There is as I noted the possibility of a broader elite plan, but what we saw in the media gave impression that the leadership of AKEL fell victim again to the manipulation and form of arrogance that these centrists politicians [with whom AKEL cooperates and brings to power] have shown in the past.

During the past two months Papadopoulos kept creating with his circle a climate of rejection of the Annan plan in the media which played upon the internal G/C propaganda we noted above. As time was passing the arguments were becoming more and more out of touch with reality. People were talking as if even the 60’s agreements were not in place to leave aside the 77 bizonal base of the talks. Or they would invoke the 1960’s agreements but then they would get all panicked about the Turkish guarantees as if poor Mr Annan invented them. The brain becomes a soup of floating arguments held together by feelings of panic and self evident truisms – we are in danger, there is a conspiracy etc. Even from Switzerland Papadopoulos circle was sending a message of doom. The “Turks got everything” wrote even kharavgi, AKEL’s newspaper – the defence of the left was obviously falling apart if even its mouthpiece was reproducing the cheapest nationalist propaganda of the past. By the time the political elite came back, it seemed that AKEL was trying to persuade Papadopoulos to either avoid a no, or at least tone it down. He seemed to ignore them and went on with a careful orchestrated performance of rejectionism. The semiotics were significant. Papadopoulos didn’t play the card of Greek nationalism - he constructed his message with the signs of Greek Cypriot identity – he differentiated Cyprus clearly and openly from Greece as another state with its own interests, and his presentation played clearly with the imagery of the Cypriot flag, Makarios and the resistance to the 74 coup – even if some of his supporters in this case were the nationalists of the coup themselves. After the message Papadopoulos seemed to be going a step further and he provoked AKEL even rudely – both he and his press secretary pointed out that AKEL’s ministers could leave [should added the secretary talking in moral terms] if they disagreed with the president. It may have been “accidental” phrases, but even when the media picked them up and made them an issue, there was no backtracking or reaction. So AKEL seemed trapped. The situation seemed to bring back memories of the 80’s when they signed another agreement with a centrist [kyprianou] who then cancelled the deal once in power. And then they even faced an internal crisis and danger of losing voters to DIKO [the centrist party cooperating with AKEL]. Thus confronting Papadopoulos with the yes indeed seemed to be difficult in terms of time. So AKEL’s leadership backtracked and seemed to submit to the climate created by Papadopoulos. Of course the final decision is next week and there are still people from AKEL who insist that the party will come out with a yes. But this is what we have seen so far.

Morally and politically if AKEL goes through this backtracking and doesn’t support the yes, it will be a shameful moment in the history of the Cypriot leftist labour movement. It seems like a humiliating abdication of historical responsibility – because apart from socialism [which isn’t on the agenda for decades] the reunion of Cyprus has been the great historical project of the Cypriot left beyond religious or linguistic origins. Apart from what AKEL does finally in the referendum and afterwards, the present crisis seems to point out to the need for autonomous left organizations, for a more pluralistic left [to use a French term] in the face of AKEL’s accession to power . We need to build our defences against media control/manipulation [and not only in terms of the Cyprus problem, there are other issues coming up, like racism] by creating institutions which will resist independently of the choices of the elite of AKEL.

Let’s see now the forces amalgamated in this media constructed rejectionist hype. There were 3 forces being pulled together by the manufacturing of consent:

1. The old nationalist discourse which sees Turkism and Hellenism fighting it out like boxers in the ring of centuries. It may be a pathetic ideology in terms of rational analysis, but these kinds of imaginary wars are all around us – from Sharon in Israel to Le Pen in France. These people will be around and as long as they don’t shoot they can have their national commemorations as far as I am concerned. By themselves though they can’t pull a sizable section of the population among the G/C.

2. The second force derives from the propaganda itself. There are people who are into this pre-74 myth [in which G/C and T/C live happily together] or have bought into some idealised European paradise imagery. Being caught in the midst of this barrage of negativism they suddenly feel that the solution isn’t good enough because it “keeps the two communities apart”. This is the case usually with people on the left who all of a sudden seem to want socialism and paradise here and now. Pointing out that a leftist rational analysis implies seeing the context and history is a good start but they need time to unwind from the inflated sense of crisis created by the media. The fact that they hearing also racist arguments of scare about the settlers doesn’t become a conscious contradiction for them precisely because the media are bombarding the subconscious in a constant barrage in which rational thought is difficult to be articulated.

3. The third current is associated with Europe and it is more ambiguous. On the one hand in both communities there seems to be an idealization of Europe which bears colonial remnants of looking to be civilized by the superiors. In this respect there is a sense that the rush to a solution is some form of a conspiracy to stop or limit this “civilizing” [and upgrading in terms of power] uplifting. On the other hand however there is also a general climate of uncertainty about what will happen once within the European Union [everyday issues from taxes to prices seem to be attributed to the integration and a sizable percentage of up to 25% had reservations about integration]. There is in this respect both expectations and uncertainty and the rejectionists are feeding both sides of the argument – claiming that a solution is better after May 1st while exploiting the uncertainty and painting the solution as an even worse force of instability.

The rejectionist hype isn’t only contradictory, it is also funny. I was talking with this guy yesterday at the kiosk and I said that it was immoral to prevent the refugees from going home by cultivating this climate of hysteria. And he said: but will they go? I said of course, and I pointed to the people of varosha and morfou. And he said: but after 3 year. I just stayed and looked at him. And if you vote no will they go earlier? Silence…I read another good example of this fragmented logic. A woman from varosha is upset about the Annan plan. A fiend inquires why, and the woman says she will get back the house, but after so many years she will need to fix it! So it is Mr Annan’s fault.

Thus the current crisis of the possibility of a yes in the G/C community should be seen more as a revelation of the problems that face the community in establishing a democratic dialogue. The nationalist hysterias of recent years were like the stock market bubbles – they dominated the political atmosphere and then they dissipated. The shift from the hysteria of the end of 2002 against the Annan plan [much like today] and the relative calm and joy which followed the opening of the lines of communication in April 2003 is indicative of the shifts. The balance within the G/C elite will be also a factor which will be shaped also by the dynamics around us – such as the moves and action of Brussels [the Americans are not an influential card on the popular level].

It seems that the lines of thought behind the no campaign are two: the one line seeks to get the G/C community in the European Union [that’s Denktash’s 2002-03 present] as a republic of Cyprus and then they hope that they might get something more.. If they don’t get anything they will just vote yes in the next referendum – especially if Brussels starts blackmailing them by threatening the end of embargo or some form of recognition of a T/C state. Another line goes for two states but it is difficult to see the long term logic of this. In the broader systemic picture Cyprus is becoming the eastern border of the European Union and as a geographical space is difficult to split – and even more significantly to keep split. If one is to project on current trends the Annan plan [in this or another name or format] will be the solution of a problem which has exhausted its historical period. Maintaining the status quo is of course a way of holding power by some while some others [e.g. real estate developers in the south like that funny guy the bishop of pafos] have every economic interest in delaying a solution.

So my dear sevgul, we should fight but we should keep also our humor. Ultimately Cyprus can’t be split. And there are now enough forces [historical and current networks] which will keep the lines of holding together the society itself – which sooner or later should realize that it is destined to play another role in the current context than simply replaying the past or suspecting conspiracies from bored bureaucrats…Still people don’t understand how the air of Baghdad, the Iraqi intifada, is changing the world around us..A world already radically different technologically and materially from the times of the 50’s, 60’s and 70’s..But this note has to finish somewhere…

copyleft (c) 2001-03 hamamboculeri.org