Konuk Yazar, 11 Temmuz 2001
Murat Ilican
Threatened Identities
“Maţţallah” for the recent political, economic and social developments that are taking place between the reciprocal motherlands of Turkish and Greek Cypriot. Last week, the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers not only agreed on pursuing more areas of cooperation between their countries, but also danced and dined together in front of the eyes of the media –thus effectively the whole world. In a way that gives out positive signals despite any existing differences the two countries may have, each one is seeking a win-win situation in their relationship so that they can enjoy its benefits. Simultaneously, each is contributing positively to the elimination of all possible differences by strengthening channels of mutual understanding and respect.
The deepening of the relationship of the two countries was admired by the ‘doves’ and hated by the ‘hawks’ not only on both sides of the Aegean, but also across the divide in Cyprus. The doves got their fair share of injection of hope for a better and more secure Aegean and Cyprus, while the hawks felt threatened that years of cultivation of oppositional Turkish and Greek identities (i.e. geared towards hatred of the ‘other’) may come to a sudden end. According to hawks’ perception, this would imply increasing uncertainty and vulnerability as regards constructed national identities and therefore their national cause, which is basically built on the premise that my loss is my enemy’s gain and vice-versa.
The field of conflict management and resolution tries to shed some light on understanding of the behavioral patterns of parties in conflict and tries to suggest ways of commonly acceptable resolutions. According its basic theories, the key is to pin point the real and constructed worries and concerns of the parties in conflict and then to come up with mutually acceptable suggestions for the resolution of the conflict in question. This science so far proved that in long lasting conflicts based on past atrocities and as a direct result on emotions such as ‘hurt’ and ‘anger’, the conflicting parties tend to evolve their respective identity seeing the other as a source of potential threat to their own existence. Thus, both parties naturally choose to strengthen their respective positions by focusing on their own mishaps ignoring any wrong doing on their behalf and shutting their ears up to what the ‘other’ has to say or has experienced. Gradually, the process of learning ceases and a stiff national stance based on egocentric behavior prevails. It is this behavior that prevents any understanding or even acknowledgement of the ‘other’, thus creating a vicious circle of self indulgence and mode of aggression so as to protect the identity perceived to be under threat.
Once the opposing identities are established and reinforced through years of one sided education and upbringing, the conflicting parties perceive any possible negotiations as a zero sum game. Thus, they fail to a high degree to deal with the ‘other’ directly and instead choose to advocate their respective positions trying to gain third party support and sympathy. The more time it takes for the healing process to start, the more alienated the parties become decreasing the chances of meaningful future dialogues.
In situations where there exists one ‘weak’ and another ‘strong’ party in conflict, the weak displays the symptom of a victim and tries to use this notion throughout the negotiations so as to have a moral advantage. The strong party, on the other hand, is in a constant state of denial that it may have inflicted damage to the weak party i.e. suffering and humiliation, so as to preserve its role as a dominant player and avoid being embarrassed.
In the case of the Cyprus Conflict, however, this process seems bi-directional –the terms are interchangeable and used accordingly by each of the communities given the setting. Between 1963-1974, the weak side was clearly the Turkish Cypriots (TC) and then the roles have been switched in 1974 where the Greek Cypriots (GC) were clearly made to be the weak party. And currently different set of criteria will result in assignment of different roles to each. For example, given economic criteria, TC and GC will be the weak and the strong party respectively and given the military criteria roles will reverse once more. The recognition criterion is another good example where the power tilts towards GC again. Thus, it is logical to assume and also observe that both parties in Cyprus not only play the victim status when it suits them, but also exert their dominance when it is seen fit for the cause of national identity protection. In a similar way, the ‘double minority syndrome’ as it has come to be called, may be used by each party in different situations –the Turkish Cypriots claim that they feel threatened by Greek Cypriot domination, while Greek Cypriots claim the same with respect to the motherlands.
In my view, there is only one way in which to resolve the Cyprus conflict in a manner that will guarantee long term, sustainable security and peace, thus economic and social prosperity for all to be shared equally. And this is if and when the two sides not only acknowledge the wrong doings of the past and the present and take responsibility for their actions, but also when they publicly apologize to each other for the pain and suffering they have inflicted in the past. Only then will a platform of mutual understanding and respect as well as channels of learning open up to lead the way forward for building a workable solution. A healthy co-existence will be the result of de-victimization and equilibration of power among the parties. The rest are simply details that need to be worked out and implemented. However, with the channels of learning and understanding of the other opening up it will be much more efficient and easier for the parties to come to terms with the basic requirements that are needed to establish a country of peace and security as well as a country with EU membership. This in my view is largely available on the negotiation table as a result of almost 40 years of inter-communal talks. What is missing is the digestion of ideas at the upper political level as well as the preparation of the two societies for a future peaceful co-existence. And the formation of institutional framework and institutions that will ensure sustainable peace such as just and fair police force that will enforce the rule of law irregardless of ethnic considerations.
The roles of third parties are also crucial. By that I mean not only the respective motherlands of the two communities living on the island, but also larger global powers such as the EU, the USA and Russia. The existence of many actors in one single play (the Cyprus Conflict) is the natural result of the fact that Cyprus is located in a location that is perceived vital for all. And therefore all are longing for the desire to have a say in Cyprus’ future, thus in the future of its larger geography. It is almost like a jigsaw puzzle. A well-known idiom that many cooks can easily spoil the broth should in this case be taken as a valid warning of possible disasters. And Cyprus should be categorized in the global context as a country of neutrality and security rather than a highly militarized, unstable island adding extra burden to the peace and stability and already distorted dynamics of the Middle east and South Eastern Europe on a mutual international and local consent.
A focussed global and regional vision will not allow the locals to play hide and seek, as has always been the case for many years and increase the chances of finding a viable, long term solution tremendously. The respective motherlands and the UK as the guarantor powers with historic social and cultural roots in the island need to be not only constructive in their attitude, but also encouraging towards the locals as well as the other powers. After all, they are much more familiar with the complexities of the issue and in a much better situation to find a win-win scenario not only for themselves but also for the locals and other international powers. There is no way the Cyprus problem will be solved without the active and almost pushy involvement of the guarantor powers and an international consensus on the final outcome.