The Role of Cultural Differences and Similarities

 in the

 Cyprus Conflict

 

Introduction

            This paper deals with an aspect of the Cyprus Conflict that has yet to be extensively studied: The role of the cultural similarities and differences between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot Communities in the occurrence, perpetuation, and possible resolution of the conflict in the island.

            In my analysis, which will follow after a brief historical background, I will briefly describe both many and important cultural patterns and features shared by the two communities and the equally (or perhaps more) important differences between the two cultures of Cyprus. Then I will try to demonstrate how communication and mutual understanding are impeded by the differences between the two communities, and, of course, how they are facilitated by the similarities.

            My examination of the cultural similarities and differences will be partly guided by Vamık Volkan’s theory on the psychology of neighboring groups. One of my assertions will be that even though some of the cultural differences between the two communities may not seem significant to an observer from outside, they do reinforce the conflict due to a process Volkan calls “rituals of minor differences”(Volkan, 1993: 10).

            I will conclude my paper with a discussion of the effects of the cultural differences and similarities on the efforts to resolve the Cyprus Conflict. In this discussion, I will refer to Avruch and Black’s “cautions” for the intervenors who have to deal with two different cultures (Avruch and Black, 1993: 142-143). I will take into consideration, however, the fact that the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot cultures are neither very different, nor exactly the same, an in-between situation that does not exactly fit into any of the three cases examined by these two authors.

 

Cyprus and the Conflict on the Island: A Historical Background

            After Sicily and Sardinia, Cyprus is the third largest Mediterranean island, located about 44 miles to the South of Turkey, with an area of 3,584 square miles (9,281 square km)[1] and a population prior to the Turkish intervention of about 660,000 inhabitants. The majority, or 80% of the population, were Greek Cypriots, 18% Turkish Cypriots, and 2% from other ethnic groups (mainly Armenians and Maronites) (Doob, 1986: 384).

            Being at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa, Cyprus has long been seen as geostrategically important, and hence conquered and ruled by a succession of empires, most recently the Ottomans and then the British.

            While the Greek Cypriots trace their origins back to the first Ancient Greek settlements of the island, about three thousand years ago, the Turkish Cypriots are the legacy of three centuries of Ottoman Rule (Fisher, 1992: 2). During most of the Ottoman, and the early period of British administration (1878-1925), the two ethnic communities lived in relative harmony with physical intermixing and social tolerance yet without significant cultural integration (Salih, 1978: 108). Following the elevation of Cyprus’ status to a “Crown Colony,” and due to the influence of anti-colonialism, earlier expressions by the Greek-Cypriot majority in favor of Énosis, or unification with Greece, were transformed into an intense struggle against British rule. A referendum held in 1950 by the Greek Orthodox Church demonstrated overwhelming support for Énosis (95.7%) among Greek Cypriots. Tension continued to rise, and a violent confrontation broke out (in 1955) with the beginning of the EOKA guerrilla campaign. The Turkish Cypriots, due to their distrust and fear toward the Greek nationalistic leadership, initially found themselves aligned more with the British. Later, as a counter-proposal to Énosis, they adopted the goal of Taksim, or partition of the island into two ethnically segregated regions, the Greek and the Turkish one. According to their plan, each region would be given to the respective “mother country.” To pursue this goal and defend their interests, they formed a paramilitary organization (TMT). (Salih, 1978: 8-13)

            In the late ‘50s, the intensification of communal violence was accompanied by a number of unsuccessful attempts by the British, and with the involvement of the governments of Greece and Turkey, to find a mechanism for resolving the conflict and moving Cyprus toward some form of self-government. These efforts paved the way for the London-Zurich Accords (1958-1959), which Britain, Greece, and Turkey practically imposed on the two communities of the island. These accords, through the Treaties of Alliance, Establishment and Guarantee, provided the basic tenets and pillars for the Constitution of the new Republic of Cyprus proclaimed in 1960.(Zahariadis & Alp, 1979: 12-22)

            Unfortunately, the leaders of the two communities attempted to implement the complex and rigid provisions of the constitution in ways that protected or advanced their group’s interests at the expense of the other, resulting in serious governmental dysfunction. Three years of dysfunctional governance culminated into a severe crisis when President (and Archbishop) Makarios, proposed a set of amendments that were unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriots. The crisis led to the re-eruption of violence.(Kyle, 1984: 8-9)

            Intercommunal fighting and the continuing segregation  of the two communities, combined with failed attempts to find a political solution, resulted in the deployment (in 1964) of the UN Peacekeeping force which remains on the island to this day.(Doob, 1986: 384-385)

            The successful peacekeeping operation, however, was not complemented by successful peacemaking, even though there has been a continuing succession of efforts by numerous third parties as well as direct intercommunal negotiations between the two parties. (Mandell, 1992: 210-212)

            The situation in Cyprus changed dramatically in 1974, when a coup against Makarios, masterminded by the dictatorship in Greece, set the scene for a military intervention by Turkey which in effect partitioned the island (Stajner, 1984: 122).

            The southern 61% of the island is now home to the Greek Cypriots, including approximately 180,000 refugees who fled from the North, leaving their homes and properties behind (Black, 1991: 59), while the northern 37%[2] of Cyprus (which in 1983 unilaterally declared its independence as the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’), is almost exclusively inhabited by Turkish Cypriots, about 65,000 of whom previously lived in the South (Kourvetaris, 1988: 187).

            Following the coup and war of 1974, a continuing series of efforts, mainly under the auspices of the UN, have, with limited success, attempted to find the basis for a peaceful resolution of the Cyprus conflict: The UN through its Secretaries-General has tried to mediate, or to perform the function of good offices between the two parties. In discussions between the leaders of the two communities within Cyprus [Denktash-Makarios (1975-1977), Denktash-Kyprianu (1977-1988), Denktash-Vasiliou (1988-1993) and now Denktash-Klerídes], mediated by the UN Secretaries-General or their representatives, and in talks between the Greek and Turkish governments, federalism (albeit with some disagreement over the meaning of the term) has been accepted, and the basic features of a future federation have been drawn. (Mandell, 1992: 213-219). Yet, there are serious problems that cannot be easily solved.

            Thus, one powerful aspect of the Cyprus Conflict is its “intractability” (Fisher, 1992: 3), or its “protractedness” (Mandell, 1992: 203). In the words of one American analyst,

 

“the conflict has resisted with tenacity the efforts of nations great and small to bring about a solution. It frustrates diplomats, amazes outside observers, irritates those who believe we have made progress in studying techniques of negotiation,..has been a sore point a sore point with secretaries-general of the United nations,...[and] has caused sadness and bloodshed, disrupting the lives of the people who live there” (Fisher, 1992: 3-4).

 

            Have cultural differences between the two communities anything to do with this “protractedness”? Or, could similarities between the two cultures play a constructive part to overcome the intractability of the conflict?

            Before trying to find answers to those questions, let us first examine how different and how similar these two cultures are.

           

Differences

            Greek and Turkish Cypriots are significantly dissimilar in many aspects, so much so that one could -without any hesitation- regard these two groups not only as two distinct ethnic groups, but also as two different nations (or at least parts of two different nations).

            Indeed, a cursory examination of these differences would show that the two communities differ -to use Nash’s terminology- in all the “building blocks of ethnicity”, or in all constituent elements of ethnicity, but the “body” (physical differences)[3]. Now let us try to discern the differences in each “building block”:

 

(A) Body: There are no distinguishable physical differences between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. This similarity, however, led to the creation -and to the narcissism- of minor differences, such as seemingly insignificant details in the way members of each group are dressed so they can distinguish each other at a glance (I will discuss such minor differences later).

 

(B) Name. The name of both communities has two components: The ethnic component: Greek and Turkish; and the territorial component: Cypriot. The ethnic component indicates the link of each community with the “mother country,” whereas the territorial component represents the belongingness of each community to the island. Even though the ethnic component has been emphasized more and more since the emergence of the conflict, the territorial component has never been ignored or discarded (Salih, 1978: 108 & 118).

            Whereas the Greek Cypriots call the Turks of the island “Tourkokyprii = Turkish Cypriots,” the Turks call the Greek Cypriots “Kıbrıs Rumları = Romans of Cyprus”. The Turkish preference of the term “Roman” to Greek (‘Yunan’ or ‘Hellen’) has historical roots[4], but also connotes an opposition to the Greek Cypriot claims that they belong to the Greek nation, and perhaps a reaction to their desire of Énosis.

           

(C) Language. The Greek Cypriots speak Greek, but their dialect (and accent) is easily distinguishable from that of mainland Greeks. The Turks of the island speak Turkish but with a distinct accent. Despite the existence of hundreds of common words -due to mutual influence during the Ottoman period- Turkish and Greek are very different languages.

            Very few Greek Cypriots can speak Turkish, while a significant but diminishing minority of Turkish Cypriots can understand and speak Greek. The language members of the two groups use to converse with members of the other community is usually English (Salih, 1978: 25).

 

(D) History and Origins: The Greek Cypriots identify themselves with the Ancient Greek, Hellenistic, and Byzantine past, while the Turkish Cypriots consider themselves direct descendants of the Ottoman Turkish conquerors (Salih, 1978: 25).

            When recounting the recent history of the island, members of each group tend to mention only their own glories and sufferings, and to refer to the other group only as victimizer. Despite more than four centuries of coexistence, the two groups have separate histories.

 

(E) Religion. The Greek Cypriots are adherents of the Greek Orthodox Church, which has had a heavy influence on politics (especially during the Makarios administration), and on education. The present Church leadership has chosen to foster the feeling of insecurity and the national sentiment against the Turks. The Turkish Cypriots belong (mostly) to the Sunni denomination of the Islamic religion. Most Moslem religious leaders have and promote inimical attitudes toward the Greeks (Salih, 1978: 25).

 

(F) Nationality. Each community considers Greece and Turkey as its mother country. The overwhelming majority of the Greeks and Turks (especially the Turks) in the island have more loyalty to their “mother countries” than they do to Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish flags are more in evidence than the flags of the Republic of Cyprus or that of the Turkish Rep. of N. Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus did not even have a national anthem, and the anthems of Greece and Turkey were played instead[5]. In addition, each community celebrates all the national holidays of their respective “mother country”.

            Notwithstanding each group’s allegiance to its respective mother country, one could also discern an embryonic form of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot nationalism (Groom, 1993: 10). In other words, each group realizes that it is to a certain extent different from (and superior to) the nation in its respective mainland, and desires to exercise self-rule (with as less interference of the “mother country” as possible) (Özgür, 1992: 263-264) over the territory it considers its own: The whole Cyprus for the Greek Cypriots, the Northern part of the island for the Turkish Cypriots. Many Cypriots have realized that the interests of each community are not necessarily identical with the ones of its mother country, and they no longer want to give priority to the latter at the expense of the former.

            These embryonic nationalisms have made the conflict even more complicated. Nevertheless, and despite the fact that most proponents of these nationalisms are not necessarily friendlier toward the other community, by emphasizing differences from the mother countries, they have started to enhance the “Cypriot” part of the identity of both communities, i.e. what connects both communities.

           

            And, as I will try to show below, it is basically the very aspects in which the two communities believe they are different from their motherland nations that they see themselves as similar to each other:

 

Similarities

            Leonard Doob, who have studied the Cyprus conflict and conducted conflict resolution workshops on the island, has observed the following similarities between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots (Doob, 1986: 390-391):

 

(1) Almost all Cypriots have profound affection for their native land. This affection Doob calls “Cypriot Patriotism” (Doob, 1986: 389-390). Thanks to this patriotism, “Cypriotness” is an indispensable part of every Cypriot’s identity.

 

(2) Even though the Turks of the island speak Turkish and the Greeks Greek, they both speak the Cypriot dialect of their respective languages. Furthermore, the two languages of the island have affected each other’s intonation, and have borrowed hundreds of words from each other.

 

(3) Despite the fact that Greeks are Orthodox Christians and Turks are Muslims, both communities are less religious in an orthodox sense or in practice and more secular in outlook, when compared to their respective coreligionists in mother countries. Cypriots are proud of their mosques and churches, but few worshipers can be seen inside, except on important holidays.

 

(4) The Cypriots believe that they themselves are socially and politically less conservative than their brethren in Greece or Turkey.

 

(5) Again, compared to the Turks and Greeks in the mother countries, they generally are better educated. In fact, Cyprus has one of the highest averages among all countries in years of formal schooling.

 

(6) They believe that they are more honest both in word and in dead, and that their business methods are honorable. They proudly declare, for instance, that “they don’t try to cheat even foreigners.”

 

(7) Their folk music and dancing, their cuisine, their proverbs and folk tales, and other folkloric elements are very similar, due to mutual influence throughout four centuries of coexistence.

 

(8) Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been strongly affected by Great Britain, since Cyprus has been a British colony for 82 years. The British introduced many of their own customs and institutions to both communities.

 

(9) A large number of Cypriots, both Greek and Turkish, in pursuit of better economic and other opportunities had to migrate overseas, mainly to Britain, particularly to London, where today the number of the Cypriot community has exceeded the population of Nicosia, the island’s capital. These immigrants have faced the same hardships, the same problems, and cases of solidarity between Greek and Turkish Cypriot individuals have not been uncommon.

 

(10) Finally, members of both communities believe that in the past, intercommunal relations were not so negatively affected by the intense enmity toward the other nation, a feeling which accompanies each mainland nationalism, but that they were relatively good, even friendly.

 

            Many middle-aged Turkish Cypriots, nowadays compare themselves to the Turkish (and some Kurdish) settlers who have come from Anatolia, whose physiques, clothes, customs, and behavior they consider “strange,” if not “inferior”, and gradually discover that they are more similar to the Greek Cypriots than to Anatolian, i.e. mainland Turks. Likewise, many Greek Cypriots who migrated to Greece have been disappointed and disillusioned by the different lifestyle, and the snobbish attitude of the mainland Greeks towards them (Doob, 1986: 392).

 

            The two communities present other similarities as well, some of which were discerned by J. Tenzel and M. Gerst, a psychiatrist and a psychologist respectively. Using pre-partition Cyprus as a psychopolitical laboratory, Tenzel and Gerst tried to explore the cultural and psychological dimensions of the continuous intercommunal conflict on the island by analyzing the beliefs, values and “stereotypical cognitive structuring” of each ethnic group (Volkan, 1979: 33). Their analysis led them to three conclusions:

(a) each community in Cyprus perceives its own cultural characteristics and values very similarly;

(b) each community perceives the other group’s characteristics in related but negative terms, using the same “dimensional frame of reference” but applying the negative side of each dimension to the other community; and

(c) within these frames of “similar autostereotypes” and negative “heterostereotypes” there are some differences that reinforce the negative opinion of each other (Volkan, 1979: 35).

The first two conclusions indicate that each group sees itself as the mirror image of the other. From that one can infer that each group must be in some sense quite similar to other (Volkan, 1988: 106-107).

The third conclusion indicates something else: It demonstrates that “the Greeks and the Turks on the island seemed to share the same cultural reference which magnifies small areas of difference, such that they become the main criteria for the establishment of trust or its reciprocal in the relationship between each group” (italics added) (Volkan, 1988: 107). In other words, one of the similarities between the two communities is that they both emphasize the small differences between them.

 

            Therefore, there appears to be another psychological-cultural factor, besides the substantial differences and important similarities that influence intercommunal relations: The rituals or the narcissism of minor differences, which is discussed below.

 

Minor Differences:

Their importance, and their role in the conflict

            The narcissism of minor differences (a term coined by Freud) is, according to Volkan, a phenomenon where a group (or a person, for that matter) is preoccupied with the interplay of the principles of sameness and distancing with respect to enemies and allies. It is observed in cases of intergroup conflict where the two opposing groups may seem alike but they have minor differences. “Rituals to maintain these differences keep a psychological gulf between the opposing groups that absorbs the flow of aggression”, and hence keeps them from killing each other. Violence erupts “when playful ritualization of the preoccupation with minor differences is no longer maintained” (Volkan, 1988: 103).

 

            Therefore, minor differences are created, and overemphasized in order to separate two groups that otherwise look or are very similar. Now, we have seen that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots differ substantially in all “building blocks of ethnicity” except the “body”. We have also seen that there are many similarities between the two groups. The existence of the narcissism of minor differences in both communities indicates that the similarities were as important as the differences, thus making the two groups look alike.

 

            The absence of any physical or “body”-related differences between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and the fact that they were dressed alike, made it really difficult for members of each group to distinguish people from their own or the opposite group at a glance (before the de-facto partition). This made the creation of minor differences perhaps inevitable.

 

            Volkan gives two examples of minor differences between the two communities in Cyprus, both from the pre-partition period: (1) Different brands of cigarettes: Turks preferred those packaged in red and white, the Greeks those in blue and white. So, one could understand whether somebody was Turk or Greek, by trying to determine what brand of cigarette he (or she) used. (2) The color of sashes: In the villages, where usual masculine dress consisted of baggy trousers and shirts, the Greeks wore black sashes, the Turks red. In periods when intercommunal relations were relatively good, this ritual of color preference was a playful way to maintain group cohesiveness for each group, and a breach of this color code could be tolerated. However, when ethnic relations got deteriorated, when group cohesion was threatened, a Turk would rather die than wear a black sash, and a Greek would also refuse to death to wear a red one (Volkan, 1988: 108).

 

            Since the Turkish invasion and the de facto partition, and the physical separation of the two communities, such minor differences that show one’s ethnic identity are no longer necessary. Now the similarities between the two groups are gradually losing their relevance, and, in intercommunal relations -which continue at a minimal level- the substantial differences have become more significant than ever.

 

Concluding Remarks:

Some Thoughts on the Influence of Cultural Differences and Similarities

on the Intercommunal Talks and the Role of Third Parties

            Despite their significant differences, thanks to their interesting similarities, and due to more than four centuries of coexistence, the two communities, with the exception of their younger members who grew up after the partition, do understand each other. As far as the negotiators from both communities are concerned this is even more true. For example, the leaders and chief negotiators of the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot communities, Klerídes and Denktash, were classmates at the high school, and later worked for a short period at the same law firm (Birand, 1975, 245). As negotiators, they confronted each other several times since 1968 (Salih, 1978: 113).Thus they know very well each other’s patterns of behavior.

            The Cyprus conflict is not a conflict of cultural misunderstandings or miscommunication. It is basically a conflict “about the pie”, or how to share the pie, the pie being the island of Cyprus.

            The lack of progress in the intercommunal negotiations can probably be attributed to lack of willingness to compromise, lack of confidence, lack of urgency, and lack of empathy but not to lack of communication.

            Another reason why these talks have not been successful enough is perhaps the nature of the third party intervenors, namely the UN Secretaries-General (UN-SG) and the US State Department’s Special Coordinators on Cyprus (SCC).

            What is wrong with the third parties?

            I will try to answer this question with the help of Avruch and Black’s analysis of third parties’ roles in intercultural negotiations (1993: 141-143):

            These authors construct three “possible scenarios” for third parties in intercultural conflict resolution:

 

“(1) The parties to the conflict come from different cultures, and the third party is from yet a different culture.

 

 (2) The parties to the conflict share the same culture, but the third party is an outsider.

 

 (3) The parties to the conflict come from different cultures, but the third party shares a culture with one of them.”

 

 (Avruch and Black, 1993: 142)

 

            The Cyprus conflict at first glance seems to fit into the first scenario: The Turkish and Greek Cypriots belong to different cultures, and the third party (UN-SG or SCC) is from yet another culture. Yet this is misleading; one can understand why the case of Cyprus does not fit into this category by reading what functions the authors suggest for the third party in such a situation: “the third party should function as an interpreter... translating first to his or her culture, then to the relevant  party’s”. He or she should be aware of the “opacities” that might occur, and of the problems of translation that might appear both in translating one party’s message to his/her own language and to the other party’s. The authors go on to say that sometimes the contending parties may share very little other than the “notion that intervenors or mediators are valuable (...) resources in the resolution of conflicts”. The situation in Cyprus is radically different from what is described here, for the parties are able to communicate and share much more than just a belief that mediators are important and helpful.

            As I tried to show in the previous sections of this paper, the two cultures of the island are different and similar: they are different enough to be considered two distinct ethnic groups, but they are similar enough to be able to understand and easily communicate with each other. Consequently, as far as the contending parties are concerned, the Cyprus Conflict constitutes an in-between case that does not really fit into any of the three scenarios. On the other hand, the third party in the case of Cyprus (UN-SG, or its representatives, and SCC) is an outsider. Thus, the situation in Cyprus is more similar with the second scenario, despite the fact that, there, the contending parties are from the same culture.

            Avruch and Black suggest that in that case, the third party should play a “facilitating role”, or a role that provides “good offices”. This is exactly the role designed for the UN-SGs in Cyprus, even though lately they have de facto assumed the role of a mediator.

            The reason why the UN-SG is chosen as a third party to this conflict is precisely what the authors suggest: Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots see the UN-SG and the UN as being willing and (with the help of the US, perhaps Britain, and other Security Council members) able to guarantee and enforce their compliance to a negotiated settlement, if it is reached, of course.

            In addition, the authors advise the third party to be careful, not to get in the way, not to complicate the problems by trying to impose his/her own cultural values on the parties, and perhaps more importantly, not to be deceived, or gulled or otherwise used by the parties. Fortunately, the UN (or the UN-SGs) has not made any of those mistakes.

            Black and Avruch also suggest that the outsider-third party in such a situation should help the contending parties “find a third party who is an insider” (1993: 143). This is what the UN-SGs have not done, and -to the best of my knowledge- have not attempted to do in Cyprus. Perhaps it is the lack of an insider co-intervenor, or co-mediator (who could provide the UN-SG with additional insight and valuable information) that has prevented the UN-sponsored conflict resolution efforts from becoming fruitful enough.

            One reason why the UN-SGs did not search for an insider could be the distrust of each party towards the other, which is a very serious obstacle blocking any insider from being accepted as a third-party. If this insider was from the Greek section he/she would be rejected by the Turkish Cypriots; and vice-versa, if he/she was from the Turkish section, he/she would be rejected by the Greeks.

            Yet, although the appointment of an insider as co-mediator seems, for the time being, hardly possible, the UN-SG can still ask for the help of insiders committed to a federal solution, or he can be offered help.

            A significant proportion of the elite and intellectuals in both sides is eager to contribute to the efforts that would lead to a federal, bicommunal, but unified Cyprus. Many of them constitute the clientele of many conflict and peace researchers, who for more than two decades have been conducting conflict resolution workshops on the island. These elites and intellectuals often try to influence the leadership of their own ethnic group and to break its recalcitrance. In addition to such efforts however, they could play a third-party-like role: they could get organized and try to promote contact with members of the other community, they could initiate intercommunal sporting, artistic etc. activities and they could even develop and propose solutions for specific aspects of the Cyprus conflict. 

            Leonard Doob, in his article on Cypriot patriotism mentions the “New Cyprus Association,” a grass-roots organization established on the Greek side, whose goals include all of what I outlined above (Doob, 1986: 394). Since then, there have been several bi-communal initatives aiming at contributing to the resolution of Cyprus conflict. This journal (Crossings), and the bi-communal student activities mentioned in its previous issue, are two very good examples of such efforts.The proliferation of such organizations might make a federal solution more possible, and easier to achieve.

            Such organizations should keep reminding the members of both ethnic groups of their cultural similarities, and they should help communities become familiar with each other’s culture. Familiarity (and liking) could diminish the mutual distrust and fears between the two communities and precipitate a resolution of the conflict. In simulations conducted by D. Druckman and B. Broome with scenarios resembling the Cyprus conflict, it has been found out that negotiators were more flexible when confronted with an opponent whom they knew and liked (Druckman & Broome, 1991: 587).

            Any federal solution must be based on the similarities between the two cultures. The differences will of course continue to exist, but they must be balanced by the similar aspects in the two cultures. Similarities should be emphasized and reinforced with a view to transform the identity of the island’s inhabitants; in other words, to help the territorial part of both groups’ identity, that is their “Cypriotness”, prevail over the ethnic part, that is “Greekness” and “Turkishness”.

 

            However, because of the partition, the similarities have started to fade away or to become irrelevant. The new generation of Turkish and Greek Cypriots is largely unaware of them. Moreover, it has no practical knowledge of the other community, only stereotypes (Groom, 1993: 10). If no resolution of the conflict is achieved within this decade, partition will become permanent, and all the hopes for a federation will expire. Then Cyprus will remain in a permanently touch-and-go situation where two enemy neighbor groups, unfamiliar with and fundamentally different from each other, will be ready and willing to fight, but deterred only by the UN peacekeeping force, and the balance of power between the two sections and the two “mother countries”.

 

            But Cyprus deserves a better future.

 

___________________

 

 

References Cited

 

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_______. 1988. The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships. Northvale, NJ: J. Aronson, Inc.

 

_______. 1993. “Ethnonationalistic Rituals: An Introduction” Mind and Human Interaction,  November: 3-19.

 

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