Konuk Yazar, 25 Temmuz 2002
Ayla Gürel
WHAT KIND OF A SETTLEMENT WOULD TURKISH CYPRIOTS LIKE?
It will surely be a mistake to talk as if there is such a thing as 'the Turkish Cypriot view' of a settlement on Cyprus. Of course, there is the official Turkish Cypriot position but, as one would expect, there are also other positions that find considerable numbers of supporters among Turkish Cypriots. These 'non-official' positions, as I might call them, sometimes show considerable overlap with the official position; and sometimes they do not.
In this paper, I try to give an overview of the various positions in North Cyprus as regards (a) a political settlement and (b) EU membership. First, I consider the views of individual citizens as indicated by various polls. (Unfortunately, the most recent poll I have managed to reach is dated August 20001, and since then a lot has happened.) I then go on to talk about the positions of the major political parties and of the Turkish Cypriot leadership.
Before distinguishing between these various positions, however, let me mention two features that appear to be common to all positions in the north -- official and non-official, features that almost all Turkish Cypriots would like to see included in any settlement. First, the terms of the settlement should contain all the necessary precautions to prevent the Turkish Cypriots from becoming a protected minority within a Greek Cypriot state. Second, Cyprus should be bi-zonal, i.e., it should be based on two territories, roughly coinciding with the current Turkish Cypriot section in the north and the Greek Cypriot section in the south. And these territories should be run by separate administrations.
It is on the issue of how these two administrations, the Turkish Cypriot administration and the Greek Cypriot administration, are to be related that views among Turkish Cypriots diverge. Here are the main ideas in circulation as regards a framework for a solution:
As shown by recent polls conducted in the north, the first and last of these options are not very popular among Turkish Cypriots*. One poll done in August 2000 shows only a 5.3% support for the unitary state option, and only a 7.7% support for integration with Turkey. It is worth noting the recent diminishing enthusiasm for these two options, e.g. 11.5% in October 972 and 8.2% in December 993 for integration with Turkey; and 6.6% in October 97 for a unitary state.
According to the August 2000 poll again, the remaining vast majority Turkish Cypriots are split between options (b), (c) and (d), with 23.3% for two independent states (lower than the 38% of October 97 and December 99); 27.2% for a confederation of two states (higher than the 14.5% of December 99); and 31.7% for a bi-zonal bi-communal federation (lower than the 47.6% of October 97 but somewhat higher than the 28.2% of December 99).
So, it seems that a large majority of Turkish Cypriots do not want a unitary state with the Greek Cypriots or integration with Turkey, but rather would like to have their own, at least autonomous, administration. And of these, over 70% would like to have their administration to be in some form of union with the Greek Cypriot administration.
It can be said that more Turkish Cypriots now than was ever the case in the 80s and 90s are becoming convinced that a completely independent Turkish Cypriot state is not a real option. The experience since 1983 has shown them that (a) such a state is going to always have to be heavily dependent on Turkey, militarily, economically and hence politically, and not least, as some Turkish Cypriots will say, because Turkey prefers it that way; and (b) it is most unlikely that such a state will ever get international recognition, save perhaps by one or two Islamic or 'Turkic' states.
Needless to say, the desire by Turkish Cypriots to see the current status quo changed has been made stronger because of the added strain and frustration caused by the worsening economic circumstances. The recent financial crisis in Turkey, especially the devaluation of the Turkish Lira by about 50%, also dealt a great blow to the TRNC economy which has already had enough problems caused by the long-term Greek-Cypriot led economic embargo and isolation.
It is therefore not surprising that the resumption of direct talks between Denktash and Clerides on 16 January has raised a lot of hope and wishful optimism -- perhaps more in the north than in the south. That a political settlement, followed by EU membership of Cyprus as a whole, may become reality is earnestly desired by most Turkish Cypriots. The alternative, where there is no settlement and what is now known as the Republic of Cyprus joins the EU, is a most undesirable scenario for the Turkish Cypriots, at least for most of them. This alternative would also, of course, be a most unwelcome eventuality for the EU and for Turkey herself, a point I hardly need to elaborate here.
Now, perhaps due to the growing aspirations of Turkish Cypriots to go into EU, increasingly more of them take it for granted that EU membership is going to be a part of any settlement package. This is despite any reservations their leadership may still harbour about Cyprus' EU membership. An important issue for the leadership is, needless to say, whether even a united Cyprus should join the EU before Turkey does.
So, Turkish Cypriots in general are strongly in favour of joining the EU, seeing in this alignment, rightly or wrongly, many promises: prosperity and stability, peace and security, more democracy and a freer exercise of their human rights. This enthusiasm is clearly reflected in the polls. According to one poll conducted in 2000, over 90% of Turkish Cypriots would like to be in the EU. Of these, 32% think a settlement should come first and Cyprus should join the EU only after Turkey does. The rest say the island should join the EU without waiting for Turkey. About 45% would like a settlement before EU accession, while 23% want Cyprus to go in as soon as possible, with or without a settlement. The latter figure, given what Cyprus going in without a settlement must imply for Turkish Cypriots, needs an explanation. Probably it is simply the most extreme expression of exasperation in the north at the seemingly endless predicament of isolation.
These are the views of Turkish Cypriots considered as individual citizens. Now I would like to turn to the views of the parties in the TRNC and also to the views of the leadership.
Of the political parties I will consider only the mainstream ones. It is noteworthy that in the TRNC, by looking at whether a party is on the right or on the left, one knows that party's position in the debate over what constitutes an acceptable framework for a settlement. The parties on the right generally stand for a two-state framework, where each Cypriot state will have its own 'equal sovereignty' (some would like to also add 'separate right to self-determination'), and as little to do with the other state as possible (e.g., a confederation). The left-wing parties, on the other hand, not being so preoccupied with the concept of sovereignty, support a bi-communal bi-zonal federation in which the two communities will be politically equal. (The phrase 'political equality' is, of course, another term open to more than one interpretation.)
Let me now give a brief overview of the parties of the right:
UBP (National Unity Party) has the biggest representation in the current parliament (23 seats out of a total of 50). Its leader is Dervish Eroglu. DP (Democrat Party) is the second party in the parliament with 11 seats. It is led by Salih Coshar. Both of these parties are nationalist and centre-right.
UBP, when it was first formed in 1975, was in a sense the party of the Turkish Cypriot establishment or ruling elite. This is no longer true, however, since especially after the formation of DP by a group of Denktash loyalists (including Denktash's own son) who, as a result of some rivalry within the party, left UBP in early 1990s. UBP and DP are now partners in the coalition government running the TRNC, with Eroglu as the prime minister and Coshar as his deputy.
The other two smaller right-wing parties were also formed as a result of splits from UBP. Their outlook tends to be more nationalistic than the two bigger right-wing parties.
MAP (National Justice Party), led by Kenan Akin, has only 1 seat in the parliament. It is a nationalist far-right party, with close affinity with the nationalist far-right National Action Party in Turkey. UDP (National Resurgence Party) is led by Enver Emin (a famous ex-footballer and a former UBP MP). This party has no seats in the parliament.
The right wing parties characteristically are loyal supporters of the view of the leadership, or what I think we may call the official position, on Cyprus. It is important to remember that this official position is formulated and pursued in full agreement and cooperation with the government of Turkey. Therefore, whilst I am talking here ostensibly about what Turkish Cypriots want, it must be realised, at any rate as regards the official Turkish Cypriot position, that this will be inseparable from the position on Cyprus taken by the Turkish government.
I will now try to spell out, as best I can, the main features of this position.
As stated in the government protocol of the current UBP-DP coalition, in efforts to find a settlement on Cyprus, the following principles are absolutely indispensable: equal sovereignty, the continuation of Turkey's effective guarantee, and the resolution of the property issue by way of property exchange and/or compensation.
It appears from the various recent official pronouncements that the Turkish Cypriot leadership is proposing a framework for a settlement that envisages a structure called the Cyprus Partnership. This is seen as a 'realistic' set-up that will create 'an atmosphere of mutual respect, reconciliation, and a working relationship between the two parties (I am quoting here form the Opening Statement by Mr Denktash, 4 Dec 2001 Clerides-Denktas meeting). The essential features of this proposal, in so far as can be gathered from various publicly available documents and statements, are as follows:
A perhaps significant terminological point here is that each partner state is said to have its own 'nationals' but citizenship seems to be though of as resulting from membership of the 'Cyprus Partnership'.
I now turn to the parties of the left.
CTP (Republican Turkish Party) is led by Mehmet Ali Talat, and has at the moment 6 seats in the parliament. It is the oldest Turkish Cypriot Party, established in 1970 and was originally close to its Greek Cypriot counterpart, AKEL.
TKP (Communal Liberation Party) was founded in 1976 and has as its leader Huseyin Angolemli, who has recently taken over from Mustafa Akinci. The latter stepped down after the breakdown in June 2001 of the UBP-TKP coalition government.
The third party on the left is YBH (Patriotic Unity Party), represented by its general-secretary Izzet Izcan. YBH was created around 1998 by the union of a small party called YKP (which originally split from TKP and was led by Alpay Durduran) with a group that left CTP, including the latter's long-time leader, Ozker Ozgur. YBH has no representation in the parliament. Nevertheless it attracts a lot of attention by its radical and often quite brave out-spokenness.
Despite the fact that the Turkish Cypriot left is more or less defined by its opposition to the official line, even when in the government, as was CTP between 1993-96 and TKP between 1999-2001, this has not helped its parties to form successful alliances in uniting forces to fight their opposition cause.
The view of the Turkish Cypriot left, or opposition, is that the policy of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, i.e., Mr Denktash, which is developed and pursued in full cooperation with the Turkish government, has been to preserve and get legitimacy for the status quo, or what are often called the 'realities' on the island. The left believes that this policy is misguided. On their view it has only helped to prolong the conflict between the two sides. Moreover, they claim that the status quo with no political settlement on the island, especially now, is increasingly against Turkish Cypriot interests (and also against Turkey's, properly understood).
The opposition generally also agrees (though some groups on the left may need a little pressing before doing so) that, like the policies of the Turkish side, the policies of the Greek side too have so far prevented a settlement. Their point is that neither the pre-74 situation nor the situation today where there is no solution can be acceptable. The conclusion, therefore, is that there is an urgent need to change the status quo.
On their view, we are now at a point where the two Cypriot sides must try to be creative. They must seek to find mutually acceptable formulae and reconciliatory policies that will be beneficial for all, rather than insist on uncompromising policies, even if that means paying a very high cost.
Let me quote from a recently produced CTP booklet (November 2001) where this concern is expressed:
We must understand before it is too late that the status quo that is being defended is against us [meaning the Turkish side as a whole].
It is necessary to stop appearing to be the side seeking refuge in the status quo, and to start formulating and implementing policies that will help to replace this status quo that brings no benefits to the Turkish people but only losses, with a mutually agreed and sustainable new structure.
And here are some additional points from a recent article by Akinci:
The newly started negotiations between Denktas and Clerides represent a new and also perhaps the last opportunity to find a mutually agreed settlement on Cyprus. If these talks fail and the blame remains with the Turkish side it is now almost certain that the Republic of Cyprus will be made a member of the EU in the name of the whole island. Such a development will not only entrench the division on the island, but will also turn the Green Line into a border between EU and Turkey and Turkey into an invader of EU land; Turkish Cypriots will be encouraged to emigrate to EU countries; it will destroy the results of the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey; and will dynamite Turkish-EU relations.
To put it in a nutshell, the opposition is of the opinion that a bizonal, bicommunal federation based on the political equality of the two parties, as envisaged in the 1992 Set of Ideas, constitutes a mutually acceptable framework for a settlement.
The essential points in CTP's idea of a settlement are as follows:
One notes the fundamental difference between this position and the official position: while the latter is based on a partnership of two states each with its own equal sovereignty, in the opposition's position the partnership is envisaged to be one of politically equal communities, with sovereignty residing in the partnership.
For views that give an idea about the specific TKP line, we can turn to Akinci again:
The most reasonable, feasible and implementable option is ... to solve the Cyprus Problem by negotiations that will concentrate on the substance rather than the name of the solution being sought; that will draw up a framework in a way acceptable to both sides; that will be bizonal; that will ensure the equality and the security of the two sides; that will allow each side to have 'internal sovereignty' in its own territory; and that will bring the two sides together under a single international personality.
TKP, like CTP, regards Turkey's guarantee as indispensable. On the other hand, Akinci seems to prefer not to commit himself either to the notion of 'partner states' or to the notion of 'partner communities' and just talks 'sides.' However, he introduces this new phrase of 'internal sovereignty,' by which, I think, he means self-governance.
YBH, the third left-wing party in the TRNC, agrees with the other two on wanting the settlement to be a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation based on the political equality of the two communities. On the issue of Turkey's guarantee, however, YBH has a different approach. It is, to say the least, not keen on such a guarantee. It regards the 1960 system of guarantees, as has been amply demonstrated, not capable of guaranteeing either the unity or the independence of a Federal Cyprus.
Finally I would like to say something about the parties' approaches to EU membership.
Take the official position first.
As is well known, the current application for Cyprus' EU membership was made unilaterally by the Greek Cypriots, and the official Turkish Cypriot position is that Turkish Cypriots can have nothing to do this application. For, if they did, this would mean cooperating with a government, which illegally claims to represent the whole island including both communities. For the Turkish Cypriot side, this is a matter that lies at the heart of the Cyprus problem. Another reason of objection to this membership is of course the idea that Cyprus cannot be a member of the Union since Turkey is not in it. Both of these objections arise from the Turkish side's understanding of the 1960 Accords.
By processing this unilateral application from one of the parties, notwithstanding all the opposition from the other, the Turkish establishment believes, the EU has put itself in a biased position vis-à-vis Cyprus. It has swallowed Greek propaganda whole.
This fundamental opposition to Cyprus' EU membership on the part of the Turkish Cypriot establishment seems to be softening. Following the Helsinki Summit decision on Cyprus in December 1999, and as EU-Turkey relations gradually improve, a less adamant position may be emerging. For example, President Denktash in his statement which I mentioned before says:
We took note of the recent statements by the EU officials that EU will accommodate itself to the terms of the political settlement to be agreed on by both parties. In this respect, we will support the membership of the Cyprus Partnership in the EU within the terms of a political settlement.
For the opposition, however, notwithstanding the complications and contradictions caused by the current application in progress, EU membership has come to be regarded as the road to salvation. On their view membership will bring not only many benefits to Cypriots but will also help to sustain any political settlement. Therefore, the opposition thinks, Cyprus should be allowed to join the EU immediately after a settlement.
All I have tried to do here is to present as briefly -- and as dispassionately -- as I can the spectrum of Turkish Cypriot opinions about what needs to be done to solve the Cyprus problem. To assess the viability of these opinions, given the positions on the Greek side, would require another paper, at least.
* Muharrem Faiz, Kıbrıslı Türkler Ne Düşünüyor, Görüş Dergisi, no. 50, February-March 2002
Speech made on the 1st of March 2002 at the Association for Greek, Turkish and Cypriot Affairs in London