Hayvanlar Adası, 22 Ekim 2001
Turgut Durduran
Kissingerian Animals III: What is more "evil" in the eyes of US National Security Council in 1960; (a) violent paramilitary groups butchering people , or (b) a possible communist subversion?
I like browsing through official documents to see what secret services, foreign affairs bureaus etc reported about Cyprus during the "hot-years". Recently -- to my delight -- I have discovered a wonderful on-line database called "US Declassified Documents Archive" through which I can do full-text searches, see the whole scanned document aswell as the contents in text format. I sometimes sit down in front of the computer and enter some keywords and scroll through these documents. I find it amusing to try to guess the scratched out parts due to "national security reasons".
I found this particular report from the National Security Council issued in February 9th, 1960 and was declassified on October 21st, 1985 (Fiche# 1986-116, NSC 6003). Like many other secret documents it was marked as being "unsanitized" and "incomplete". This 38 pages long report titled "US Policy Towards Cyprus" outlined variety of aspects related to US interests which turned out to be quite interesting. Its timing is particularly interesting because its during the transition period of the creation of "an independent Cyprus".
It is stated that "the President has this date approved the statement of policy ... directs its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government; and designates the Operations Coordinating board as the coordinating agency," i.e it became an adopted part of the US policy towards Cyprus.
I have read a few articles and books on the subject of US-British involvement in Cypriot affairs aswell as their involvement in the Greek Junta and the events of 1974. I am not a very careful reader of these books so I did not note down whether this particular document was listed there. So I am not making a claim of "discovery" of a new document here.
Let's take a look at a long list of "Objectives" and "Major Policy Guidance" that National Security Council prepared and comment about a few particularly interesting ones (see below for the full list).
The most important theme seems to be that Cyprus should be independent and in a political condition to resist communism aswell as providing groundwork for the "West" to fight against communism. This theme appears again and again in American documents even in those that discuss horrible murders, the breakdown of the whole state mechanism and what not. The murders are sometimes of lesser relevance and importance than "communist subversion".
This is stated very openly as in the first Objective which is formulated as "21. A politically stable Cyprus, linking Greece, Turkey, and the United Kindgom in a cooperative relations ship, and willing and able to resist Communist subversion. "
It is quite interesting that not only Cyprus should be politically
stable (which is a "good" thing upon first glance) but also "be
willing and able to resist Communist subversion". Judging from the
historical course of events and US government relationship with the
Greek Junta and their Cypriot extension EOKA-B's activities against
communists in Cyprus, it is clear that "politically stable" does not
mean what one would think immediately. This is also explained later on
in the report as:
Now, it is clear that "political stability" can be thrashed if it does
not equate with a "proWestern orientation and free democratic
institutions". Still, there is some positive side to this suggestion
since it supports "free democratic institutions".
However, later on the report when the "Major Policy Guidance" is being
outlined, we see that "free democracy" takes on an interesting form
too. The report suggests "them" to "39. Be prepared, as
appropriate and feasible, to encourage the reimposition of the ban on
the Communist Party of Cyprus." . "*Free* democracy" with
a ban on the communist party is quite familiar to many countries of
"cold war" era.
Well, may be given the cold-war days and the strategic location of
Cyprus and that the British had already banned the communist party at
some point causing the communists to go underground, there could be
some tolerable measure of this sorts. However, the document does not
stop at that, it also suggests to "38. As feasible help strengthen
non-Communist labor organizations in Cyprus." So now not only the
"free" part of the democracy is being thrashed but also direct foreign
intervention is being called upon.
Atleast these are non-violent suggestions (well, only so if I
suddenly assume an amnesia that caused me to forget about the history
of the labor unions in US). Apparently they are not enough, US should
also "40. Discreetly encourage the new Cyprus government to
develop, maintain, and train its internal police and security services
to combat Communist subversion." (note the use of word
"discreetly" here) and "41. encourage the Cypriots to look to
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom and encourage these countries to
take cooperative action to equip the Cypriot forces, preferably along
the lines of a lightly armed, mobile constabulary with an internal
security mission. "
One could still very naively think that there is nothing wrong
with this because -- who knows -- a Cypriot Che Guevara might surface
one day and start an armed revolution which should be combatted (and
indeed the Americans later on thought that Makarios was "the Castro of
the Mediterranean" or the "red priest"). Unfortunately, I am not so
naive and I know something about the Cypriot history both before and
after this report. A country with a variety of supposedly disbanded
paramilitary groups with fashist, violent tendencies, close loyalties
to "mainlands" which both had exemplary(!) democracies and long term
greedy plans over it. A country whose political leaders are veterans
of paramilitary struggles with questionable aims. Yes, in this country
the unescapable conclusion is that most needed institution is an armed
force to tackle communism equipped by "guarantors" one of which is an
expert in "divide and rule" and the other two which have immediately
moved on to the violent destruction of the republic using the
paramilitary groups and the "national guard" itself. Given all this,
ofcourse, communism is the ultimate evil to be combatted(!), why worry
about the genocidal tendencies of those paramilitary groups?
It also happens that the US government knew that this was in cooking
when this report was prepared. When listing "Internal Strengths
and Weaknesses" the report does a fairly thorough job. It notes
that "the arrangements can only work successfully with the
goodwill of the Greek and Turkion Cypriot communities and the
continued cooperation of the Greek and Turkish Governments." This
is fairly obvious and is repeated frequently by critics of the
situation in Cyprus. At that point "there are no indications that
the establishment of an independent Cyprus will give rise to a
specifically Cypriot nationalism" which is very worrying given
the situation in 1960s (Nowadays I tend to think that Cyprios
nationalism is not only not necessary but also can be dangerous). This
is not the only problem the report foresees; "Recent years of
emergency have subordinated moderate Cypriots, both Greek and Turkish,
to extremist leaders who did not hesitate to use force and
intimidation to ensure absolute adherence to the national program of
their separate communities." This means that the goodwill did not
exist which in turn implies that the US government was very well aware
that this independent republic being formed was doomed for failure.
"The Political ambitions of General Grivas, the former Chief of
EOKA, appear to lie primarily in Greece. Nonetheless, he remains a
potential disruptive element in cypriot politics. Grivas' past
attempts to undermine the Archbishop and the settlement itself have
not seriously endangered Makarios' leadership, and open political
support for Grivas in Cyprus seems limited to a small clique
surrounding the Bishop of Kyrenia. Grivas can. however, play upon the
admiration accorded him as the almost legendary hereo of the
liberation struggle an dupon the continuing dedication to enosis of
the majority of the Greek Cypriots, most of whom appear to hope that
Cypriot independence is but a step toward eventual union with
Greece." Such an accurate analysis. Only within several years
Grivas became a major, violent opposition against Makarios. I believe
these combined clearly show that the US government was aware of the
activities of the paramilitary groups and extremist leaders but still
went onto consider communism as the most important danger.
US government was not unaware of the delicate political situation in
Greece either. " Greek Premier Karamanlis is closely associated
with the present settlement and is committed to its sucess. The
cooperation between Makarios and Karamanlis, and the latter's thus far
effective opposition to Grivas in the Greek political arena, have done
much to lessen grivas' ability to undermine makarios on cyprus and
sabotage the settlement. If the Karamanlis government should be
replaced by elements which are either not identified with the Cyprus
settlement or actually opposed it, the chances for stability on the
island would worsen, and the situation could deteriorate
rapidly." Isn't this a sign that the upcoming Junta and what it
could cost for Cyprus was predictable? May be not the junta (I am not
familiar with its making very well.) but certainly the "elements" that
could ruin the island's future.
Still, this is not enough, what if the local forces can not tackle the
"evil" communists? National Security council has a suggestion for that
too; 43. Do not provide direct U. S. military assistnace to Cyprus
unless the other measures in paragraphs 41 and 42 fail. If these
measures fail and if it is believed absolutely essential for the
achievement of U. S. objectives, consider in the National Security
Council the question of direct military assistance to Cyprus under the
circumstances then existing. Given the history of US military
"interventions" worldwide in particular the "assistance" given in
places like Chile, one would wonder how much further the US
preparations went for Cyprus.
The bitter truth is that the course of the events which begun to
unfold immediately after the independence showed that Cyprus had very
trustable (!) motherlands to ensure its "political stability" , "free
democratic institutions" and links between Greece, Turkey and the
United Kingdom. US forces were not needed with such eager motherlands
guaranteeing the Cypriot Republic military and politically (or its
destruction!).
Recently when Pinochet was arrested in Britain, I had high hopes
that finally the cold-war dossiers were to be re-openned and those
responsible for horrible crimes of that era would be brought to
justice. I am not so worried about whether Pinochet goes to jail but
rather I am interested in establishing more accurate versions of
history. Ofcourse, there are unclosed wounds from that era which might
have better chances of closure if this is to happen and they are
probably the most important side of this story from a humanist point
of view. Starting from the top in US, UK, Turkish, Greek bureocracies
there are many who are still alive and institutional in relevant
policies who could shed light to the dark days of Cypriot history.
The day US and whole world got into a turmoil over the September
11th attacks, I was going to write about a case being brought against
Henry Kissinger in US courts by son of a murdered Chilean
general. That was just "shocking" news the days before September 11th
but now similar actions are considered to be exemplary (!) policies
for future tackling of the terrorist threat. It seems like I have to
keep my hopes for later times.
Note: All spelling mistakes and missing parts in the quoted sections (in italics) are from the database and were left in place for accuracy.
"Objectives" and "Major Policy Guidance" sections in full:
OBJECTIVES
21. A politically stable Cyprus, linking Greece,
Turkey, and the United Kindgom in a cooperative relations
ship, and willing and able to resist Communist subversion.
22. The continued availability to the West of the
British military facilities on Cyprus.
23. [erased]
24. Cypriot economic development conducive to the
development and maintenance of political stability, a proWestern
orientation and free democratic institutions.
MAJOR POLICY GUIDANCE
25. Supoort an independent Cypriot state as the only
feasible way of achieving under present circumstances a
settlement of the Cyprus prolblem acceptable to all parties.
26. Endeavor, in collaboration with the United. Kingdom,
Greece and Turkey, to seek to maintain a pro-Western outlook
on Cyprus as a means of preserving present Free World
interests on the island.
27. [erased]
28. Avoid any U. S. action that might suggest partiaslity
between the Greek and turkish communities.
29. Support the admission of Cyprus to the U. N. and,
subject to financial policy considerations, to Free world
international financial instituations. Consider supporting
admission to other intergovernmental organizations on a
case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the role
which the Republic of Cyprus could be expected to play in
such organizations.
30. Look with favor on Cypriot membership in the
British Commonwealth as a means of strengthening Cyprus'
ties with the united Kingdom and the Free World and of
providing economic advantages to Cyprus.
31. Take no initiative to secure the admission of
Cyprus into NATO but be prepared to consider such admission
if the question is raised.
32. Encourage the Cypriot Government to establish
sound economic policies and to maintain an investment
climate which would promote both domestic and foreign
private investment.
33. Discourage the Cypriot Government from establishing
excessive economic ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc.
34. Encourage Cyprus to look to the United Kingdom, to
Western Europe, including Greece and Turkey, to the Free
World international financial institutions, and to private
investment to meet its needs for external capital.
35. Urge the United Kingdom to exercise the labor
role in supporting Cypriot economic development efforts
and in providing economic and technical assistance.
36. Encourage Greece, Turkey, and other Western
European countries to take an active interest in promoting
the economic welfare of Cyprus and to provide technical
and economic assistance within their capabilities.
37. Be prepared to provide technical assistance
on a small scale and to negotiate surplus commodity sales
under P. L. 480 as an aid in accomplishing U. S. objectives
with respect to Cyprus. Consider providing economic
development assistance to Cyprus in the event it does
not prove feasible or desirable to rely wholly on the
United Kingdom, Western Europe, and the Free World international
financial institutions. Coordinate any U. S. aid
with the assistance being provided by allied nations in order
to minimize the possibility of misunderstandings and to
prevent competition over particular aid projects.
38. As feasible help strengthen non-Communist labor
organizations in Cyprus.
39. Be prepared, as appropriate and feasible, to
encourage the reimposition of the ban on the Communist
Party of Cyprus.
40. Discreetly encourage the new Cyprus government
to develop, maintain, and train its internal police and
security services to combat Communist subversion.
41. encourage the Cypriots to look to Greece, Turkey
and the United Kingdom and encourage these countries to take
cooperative action to equip the Cypriot forces, preferably
along the lines of a lightly armed, mobile constabulary with
an internal security mission.
42. Be prepared, depending on amounts and types of
equipment involved and without commitment to make up resulting
deficiencies, to give sympatetic consideration to
possible request from Greece and Turkey that their contingents
destined for Cyprus be allowed to utilize MAP
equimpent and, in the event the provisions of paragraph 41
above prove inadequate, that Greece and Turkey be allowed
to transfer to the Cypriot armed forces MAP equipment excess
to over-all U. S. requirements. If Greece of Turkey use
such transfers as the basis for requesting the United
States to provide additional military equipment, any such
request should be referred to the National Security Council
for consideration in the light of the circumstances then
existing.
43. Do not provide direct U. S. military assistnace
to Cyprus unless the other measures in paragraphs 41 and
42 fail. If these measures fail and if it is believed
absolutely essential for the achievement of U. S. objectives,
consider in the National Security Council the question of
direct military assistance to Cyprus under the circumstances
then existing.
44. Continue to consult with the United Kingdom,
Greece and Turkey, and, if appropriate, with the Government
of Cyprus, with respect to the Communist threat on Cyprus,
and, particularly if the Communists should move to gain
control of the Government, support counteraction.